




OFFSHORE ENERGY GEOPOLITICS: AN EXAMINATION OF EMERGING 


















A thesis submitted to the Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements 















© 2014 Erik Fagley 







As the world’s conventional oil and gas fields decline, the oil and gas industry 
seeks to exploit new sources of energy to satisfy demand and promote economic growth. 
The most promising geographical regions left to explore are offshore waters that contain 
a substantial reserve base that contain decades of supply. Although offshore development 
is not new, certain regions slated for production are vulnerable to a wide-array of risks 
that might derail future activity. The examination of these risks is a timely study given its 
relevance to energy security and the ever-increasing vulnerabilities in maritime regions. 
To better explain the offshore energy geopolitical landscape, this thesis explores three 
regions – the South China Sea, Arctic, and the Gulf of Guinea. Each region typifies 
political, legal, economic and environmental risks associated with offshore development; 
however, each region is faced with markedly different risks to future operations. Whether 
this includes territorial disputes between claimants over control of seabed resources in the 
South China Sea, the absence of an effective framework to govern and regulate offshore 
activities in the Arctic, or the emergence of oil theft and maritime piracy in the Gulf of 
Guinea, each chapter highlights the importance of addressing these risks. In response, the 
thesis provides mitigating strategies and policy recommendations to alleviate tensions, 
resolve gaps in governance and regulation and combat maritime piracy. The thesis makes 
clear that if offshore development is to reach its potential, national governments, the 
private sector, and the international community must address such risks with resoluteness 
to enhance global energy security and effectively combat new forms of volatility.  
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For decades, offshore exploration and production has occurred in concentrated 
maritime areas. Such ventures were considered high risk due to a project’s cost and 
general vulnerability to extreme weather and remoteness. These concerns still exist today, 
but offshore development is now widely embraced and with over 12,000 various floating 
platforms and fixed rigs, the future is seemingly bright in the offshore.
1
 This spike in 
investment is partly due to sustained high oil prices, seismic mapping, new advanced 
drilling technologies, and renewed commitments by national governments to allocate 
offshore acreage for future production. It is also driven by the decline of conventional oil 
and gas fields. As demand growth increases and is paced by emerging economies, like 
China, new supply is required to offset declines in mature provinces. 
Supply-demand dynamics are key components to energy security and illustrate 
how the global oil market continues to evolve. In the past, price spikes were primarily 
driven by supply-side events, like the 1973-1974 OPEC embargo. Today, demand-side 
events dominate the scene where the era of relentless growth in petroleum fuels has led to 
a renaissance for the oil and gas industry. However, this does raise concerns about the 
long-term availability of global oil and gas supplies. Resource scarcity fears and price 
volatility are compounded by the fact that some of the world’s largest remaining offshore 
reserves are located in highly volatile maritime regions.  
 This is where another key component of energy security comes into play. To 
securitize future supply, importers now favor a strategy of diversification. By purchasing 
oil and gas from a variety of suppliers rather than just one, a state is less vulnerable to 
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potential supply disruption. This has become an integral part for energy security agendas 
of many national governments and has signaled a shift in energy trade. In particular, 
many importers, like the United States, are moving away from the politically volatile 
Persian Gulf towards safer and more stable suppliers. In addition, there has also been a 
push to explore domestic production potential. This includes offshore areas where many 
countries seek to enhance domestic production to lower import bills and further diversify 
its supply chain. Energy vulnerability is an omnipresent threat that will remain so as long 
as hydrocarbons and centralized energy systems are depended upon to fuel the global 
economy. To curb such vulnerabilities, diversification of supply and suppliers represents 
a new norm to ensure energy security and insulate from potential supply disruption.  
 Often considered a safer and less-risky alternative, the offshore contains some of 
the largest remaining untapped reserves. However, this thesis argues that despite reserve 
potential, there are maritime regions susceptible to conflict and tension that could inhibit 
future development options. It is the purpose of this thesis to examine the wide-array of 
risks associated with offshore development and whether such risks can be overcome and 
tempered to pave the way for future energy production. The impact of these risks in each 
region is examined in each chapter to better illustrate how offshore energy geopolitics 
presents a wave of implications over the exploitation of seabed oil and gas resources.   
CHAPTER SUMMARIES 
The first chapter asks whether a joint development agreement (JDA) can mitigate 
long-standing tensions and prevent a wider conflict between competing claimants over 
seabed resources in the South China Sea (SCS). The JDA mechanism is part of the 




ratified around the world. To achieve ratification, claimants must agree to shelve 
sovereignty and jurisdictional disputes to pave the way for joint exploitation. However, 
there are legal, economic, and political obstacles to ratification that deserve examination. 
Since tensions in the SCS are at a breaking point, it is pertinent to analyze the entire JDA 
negotiation and implementation process to highlight what obstacles or barriers might 
derail these arrangements. This chapter provides extensive research on international 
maritime law, scholarly analysis, government documents and reports to identify the risks 
and which would be most difficult to overcome. With the addition of a case study on a 
JDA arrangement in the tense East China Sea (ECS), the chapter found that the regional 
political climate makes joint development an impossible reality in the near-term. In 
particular, the rise of nationalism and resource competition are driven by China’s rise to 
power as well as strong domestic opposition to ceding sovereign control over oil and gas 
resources. Further, poor bilateral relations and the lack of political willingness of leaders 
and parties have made JDA negotiations untenable. In the ECS case study, a change of 
leadership, deep-seeded mistrust between Japan and China, negative public opinion and 
domestic politics were important factors that unglued eventual ratification. Finally, a 
history of confrontation only reinforced assertive behaviors among claimant states, which 
now more than ever before are unwilling to shelve disputes in favor of joint development.  
The second chapter asks whether large-scale offshore development can be 
achieved in the Arctic, which is undergoing dramatic environmental changes due to 
climate change and global warming. To address sustainability, the chapter asks how 
offshore development ought to be governed and regulated and what framework most 




determined that the ineffectiveness of existing international regimes to govern and 
regulate offshore activities represents a significant gap in oversight and protection. For a 
region largely undeveloped, the Arctic states and oil and gas industry lack critical 
infrastructure, comprehensive spill response strategies, and funding for its regulatory 
agencies and ongoing climate change research. Such inadequacies raise concerns over the 
economic and environmental risks associated with large-development. To address gaps in 
governance and regulation and the capabilities of the oil and gas industry to operate in 
such a harsh and unpredictable climate, the chapter provides two options – the Antarctic 
Treaty System (ATS), a legally binding international treaty; and the Arctic Council (AC), 
a non-legally binding entity already utilized in the region. The chapter finds that a new 
international convention would not be supported by the Arctic states. Rather, the AC is 
considered an effective option to tackling issues of environmental protection and oil and 
gas regulations. In fact, the AC has adapted to the evolving marine environment by 
creating offshore guidelines to improve safety and operations, reduce pollution and 
enhance environmental protection. Although these guidelines are not mandatory, they 
influenced member states to raise these issues within their national legislatures.   
The third chapter asks to what extent maritime piracy in the Gulf of Guinea poses 
a threat to future offshore oil and gas development and how it might impact global energy 
security. In an effort to address the piracy threat, the chapter also explores counter-piracy 
operations undertaken by the international community and regional powers. In particular, 
the chapter asks if industry self-help efforts and mobilization of international naval forces 
were effective tools to combatting piracy in the Gulf of Aden, and then assesses whether 




lessons from the Gulf of Aden experience, examines gaps in counter-piracy operations in 
the Gulf of Guinea and provides policy recommendations to address existing gaps.  
The chapter provides a comprehensive examination of maritime piracy through a 
comparative analysis of both regions by identifying differences in geography, motivation, 
tactics, and organizational structure. This provides clarity as to why piracy is so prevalent, 
how operations are conducted, what targets are most vulnerable to attack, and if counter-
piracy operations are effective. Moreover, piracy in the Gulf of Guinea does contrast 
significantly from that in the Gulf of Aden. In particular, pirates in the Gulf of Guinea 
target oil infrastructure and marine shipping. In a region comprised of important oil 
exporting nations and substantial offshore reserves, this threatens the security of existing 
and future operations. Further, the Gulf of Guinea is a regional body of water not an 
international waterway, like the Gulf of Adan. As a result, the littoral states assume 
complete control over their own territorial waters. Unfortunately, Gulf of Guinea states 
lack the capability and capacity to combat maritime piracy. Whether this includes the 
absence of naval and coast guard capabilities, widespread corruption, inaccurate reporting 
of attacks or ineffective law enforcement and judicial prudence, legitimate concerns exist 
about the region’s ability to address maritime security. Because such deficiencies will 
take decades to improve, the oil and gas industry must adopt strategies to safeguard 
shipments, infrastructure and its employees. For instance, the implementation of best 
management practices (BMPs) and the use of private maritime security contractors 
(PSMCs) offer immediate and short-term solutions to the piracy threat. In the long-term 
outlook, the international community must improve regional capacities and capabilities, 




For this to be successful, leaders of the Gulf of Guinea states must be willing to embrace 
collective action against maritime piracy as it represents a cost-effective resolution.  
 The purpose of the thesis portfolio is not only to examine emerging risks 
associated with offshore development, but to illustrate the complexities of offshore 
exploration and production. With the easily accessible oil and gas in rapid decline, the 
industry is faced with significant challenges by expanding into remote regions, like the 
Arctic or into more politically volatile regions, like the SCS and the Gulf of Guinea. 
Regardless, the offshore represents an arena of growth and as long as hydrocarbons 
remain the fuels of choice, these reserves will be needed to power the global economy. 
However, rising political tensions over seabed resources, the impacts of climate change 
on marine environments, and the threat of maritime piracy, not only raise the stakes, but 
also highlight concerns about the security and safety of future activities. Each chapter 
provides a mitigative strategy to counter intractable disputes, resolve gaps in governance 
and regulation, and combat maritime piracy. While these policy recommendations 
represent viable options, they do face pushback from littoral states that have sovereign 
and jurisdictional claims over seabed resources in these regions. Concepts of resource-
sharing, enhancing governance and regulation standards and bolstering maritime security 
capacities are not quick-fixes nor are unanimously supported. In fact, when examining 
the long-term outlook, the implementation of these policy recommendations will take 
patience, cooperation and sustained political will from leadership to reassure the oil and 
gas industry that future development can continue without disruption. There has been 
some traction to improve regional cooperation, implement new oil and gas standards, and 




address various risks associated, a long-term commitment from littoral states, the 
international community, the private sector, and indigenous peoples must be sustained 
and expanded to minimize such risks and continue to promote future development that 













































JOINT DEVELOPMENT OF SEABED RESOURCES IN 
THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
 
















The SCS is a hotbed for competing maritime claims. Disputes range from minor 
sources of friction between claimant states to open-water confrontations that threaten 
regional peace and security. The claimants, China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Brunei have all made claims over the SCS and its geographical features. 
Further, the discovery of significant oil and gas resources in the region has intensified 
disputes and competition over these resources. With growing fears over energy scarcity, 
claimants have become more assertive in the search for future energy supply.
2
 This is due 
to the fact that the Asia-Pacific region is comprised of import-dependent states, but is 
also expected to pace global economic growth and energy consumption in the future.
3
 In 
addition, technological advancements in deep-water drilling have made once unreachable 
offshore oil and gas now a feasible option to extract.
4
 All claimant states reiterated how 
critical seabed oil and gas these resources are to their energy security agendas; however, 
the question remains if they are willing share such resources. Therefore, the thesis asks 
whether joint development arrangements offer an effective way to circumvent disputes in 
the SCS in order to proceed with offshore oil and gas development.  
To answer this question, the thesis highlights an effective conflict avoidance 
mechanism that circumvents maritime disputes. In the past JDAs served as a mechanism 
to diffuse unsettled disputes and promote resource-sharing. There are examples where 
JDAs have been successfully implemented, but the focus of this thesis is whether this 
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provisional instrument can be applied in the SCS to help shelve maritime disputes and 
enhance cooperation through joint development of seabed resources? Given that the SCS 
presents a web of complex obstacles to JDAs, this thesis analyzes the legal, economic, 
and political barriers that could inhibit JDA implementation. In the first section, the thesis 
analyzes ongoing legal maritime disputes that overlap and are intractable. This presents a 
challenge to the JDA process as the level of intractability of disputes influences claimants 
willingness to cooperate. The second section presents a look at the economic obstacles of 
JDA arrangements ranging from investment concerns, resource competition to issues 
about the equitable split of revenues and resources. In the third section, the thesis 
examines political obstacles to the JDA process and highlights key variables that have 
impacted the negotiation and ratification process. In particular, nationalism, public 
opinion, the existence of good bilateral relations, and political will of parties and 
governments represent influential factors to the JDA process. Finally, the thesis presents 
a case study that examines the 2008 China-Japan Principled Consensus to better illustrate 
the negotiation and ratification process and identify key obstacles that had an impact on 
this JDA arrangement and also relate to the conditions in the SCS.  
UNWILLINGNESS TO SHELVE DISPUTES IS INFLUENCED BY INCONSISTENT AND 
INTRACTABLE SOVEREIGNTY AND JURISDICTION CLAIMS 
 
 Maritime disputes are not uncommon and have existed for as long as states have 
competed over territory, jurisdiction, and resources. The question surrounding the SCS is 
how claimants can resolve disputes in the presence of deeply entrenched national 




be used to help mitigate tensions in maritime domains.
5
 Articles 74(3) and 83(3) in 
UNCLOS provide an impetus for claimants to “make every effort to enter into 
provisional arrangements of a practical nature and, during this transitional period, not to 
jeopardize or hamper the reaching of a final agreement.”
6
 The JDA was designed for 
maritime disputes and as Ian Townsend-Gault argues “most joint development zones 
come about because of the inability of the countries concerned to agree on a maritime 
boundary.”
7
 Thus, the JDA presents an interim solution for claimant states to shelve 
disputes in order to jointly develop natural resources. Although a JDA is not designed to 
solve legal disputes, it is critical to examine how legal disputes, like sovereignty and 
jurisdictional claims and the presence of a joint authority can impact such arrangements.  
Complexity of sovereignty claims and the delimitation of maritime rights 
An obstacle to JDA implementation is ongoing sovereignty disputes. As Tara 
Davenport argues, the presence of sovereignty disputes is a serious obstacle to joint 
development in the SCS.
8
 In fact, disputes over sovereignty have had an impact on 
previous JDA negotiations. Jonathan Charney and Lewis Alexander argue that the 1982 
Cambodia-Vietnam JDA was almost dissolved because of the contentious sovereignty 
claims made by each claimant. If Cambodia had not been willing to concede full 
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sovereignty claim over some of islands, the JDA would have likely failed.
9
 Also, in the 
1974 Japan-South Korea JDA, parties shelved sovereignty disputes in an effort to push 
resource-sharing negotiations. In its provisions, it established that, “nothing in this 
agreement shall be regarded as determining the question of sovereign rights over all or 
any portion of the Joint Development Zone or as prejudicing the positions of the 
respective parties with respect to the delimitation of the continental shelf.”
10
 This 
illustrates that agreements can be achieved even in the presence of sovereignty disputes 
only if the claimants were willing to shelve disputes. However, the SCS represents a 
complex environment where six claimants have made sovereignty claims over offshore 
features, including seabed oil and gas deposits. With more claimants added to the mix, 
Craig Snyder argues that shelving of sovereignty disputes has not happened. Although 
Snyder believes this is not a valid reason to forgo JDA arrangements it does raise 
concerns about the effectiveness of these arrangements where SCS claimants are 
unwilling to reach an agreement over joint development options.
11
  
The best example of the intractability and complexity of sovereign disputes rests 
in the Spratly Islands. Here, states justified their sovereign claims over various 
geographical features through different channels, either by historical justification or 
international maritime law. For instance, China and Vietnam claimed sovereignty over all 
features based off of historical title. The other claimants, like Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Brunei submitted partial sovereignty claims through provisions in UNCLOS.
12
 According 
                                                          
9
 Jonathan Charney and Lewis Alexander, International Maritime Boundaries (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1998), 2336. 
10
 Article XVIII, Japan South Korea JDA 1974. 
11
 Craig Snyder, “The Implications of Hydrocarbon Development on the South China Sea,” 52:1 Canadian 
Foreign Policy (Winter 1996-1997): 154. 
12




to Peter Dutton, China’s historical claim over the Spratly Islands poses a significant 
challenge towards JDA implementation. Its nine-dash claim, which is based on the fact 
that they discovered these features centuries ago, violates UNCLOS.
13
 Lesek Buszynski 
argues China’s historical claims reinforce its rationale that it has “indisputable 
sovereignty over the South China Sea islands and their adjacent water.”
14
 Taylor Fravel 
disagrees with this assessment, arguing that China has become less assertive in the SCS 
when compared to the last period of tension from 1988 to 1994 that involved the physical 
seizure of contested features and the use of force against other claimants that challenged 
China.
15
 What cannot be denied is that China’s behavior is more assertive and continues 
to influence how other claimants react and act. If such assertive behavior to the SCS 
disputes escalates or remains unchanged, it will likely force other claimants to act 
apprehensive to entering into JDA arrangements.  
There is also a prevalence of undefined areas of dispute in the SCS. Much of the 
blame is placed on UNCLOS and its limited capacity to resolve these disputes as well as 
its ambiguous definition of geographical features. In fact, Robert Beckman argues that 
UNCLOS does not include provisions to resolve disputes over offshore islands, 
especially if it involves sovereignty claims. Although provisions exist for uses of the 
ocean adjacent to continental land territory and islands, UNCLOS does not address 
disputes where a state has sovereignty over land territory and islands. To address this 
issue, UNCLOS allows these claims to be heard by an international court for resolution; 
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however, most claimant states prefer not to rely on third-party to resolve sensitive 
disputes.
16
 At this point, there has been no third-party involvement over sovereignty 
disputes in the SCS and as a result, has made the unresolved claims more intractable. 
Other scholars point out that ambiguous definition of offshore features is a source of 
contention.
17
 Clive Schofield and Dustin Kuan-Hsiung Wang argue most features in the 
SCS are not islands rather they should be defined as reefs, rocks and low-lying features.
18
 
Nevertheless, claimant states still have to reach an agreement on which of the islands are 
rocks or reefs and to date, there has not been any such agreement over the status of every 
geographic feature. This is primarily driven by the fact that these claimant states assume 
positions on the features that favor national interests. One solution is for claimants to set 
aside these disputes to jointly develop oil and gas resources; however, Tara Davenport 
cautions that sovereignty claims are undefined under international maritime law and 




Regarding maritime delimitation, Taylor Fravel argues different states justify their 
claims to maritime rights differently. Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei 
assert their claims from their coasts. Indonesia asserts maritime rights from Natuna Island. 
While China bases its maritime rights on its claims to sovereignty over disputed islands, 
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in addition to the coast of the Chinese mainland.
20
 UNCLOS entitles states to claim an 
EEZ up to 200 nautical miles from the same baselines from which the territorial sea is 
measured. But, Lowell Bautista argues that claimants fail to negotiate on the basis of 
UNCLOS and do not adhere to the baseline criteria.
21
 As discussed, a key step in the JDA 
negotiation process is to establish a defined area of dispute for a joint development zone 
(JDZ) to be established as the future location for joint development. However, the SCS is 
remains undefined, which makes it difficult to even begin JDA negotiations.  
An inconsistent regional response to maritime disputes  
Where intractable disputes exist, a neutral third-party or regional authority can be 
utilized to resolve tensions and in the case of a JDA, manage exploration and production 
activities. In the SCS, claimant states are reluctant to relinquish control over resources as 
they view this option as an infringement upon national interests.
22
 Despite these concerns, 
David Ong argues that the establishment of a regional authority was critical for the 
success of Malaysia-Thailand JDA 1979/1990. An agreement between governments 
established a joint authority to assume all the rights and responsibilities on behalf of the 
two parties for the exploration and exploitation of oil and gas resources in the disputed 
area.
23
 This is not to argue that the establishment of a regional authority between 
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Thailand and Malaysia was not without dispute, but does provide an example of where a 
joint authority was successfully used to manage the entire operation.  
The success of a joint authority in the SCS rests on the effectiveness of the 
Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN) as well as China’s acceptance of 
regional cooperation. To date, Ian Storey argues there is little agreement on how to 
address SCS disputes as ASEAN members have competing interests and China is hesitant 
to support a regional approach. China’s strategy is influenced by its desire to utilize 
bilateral negotiations as a means to resolve disputes rather than rely upon a regional or 
international authority.
24
 Despite its preference for bilateral negotiations, China has 
participated in multilateral diplomacy through ASEAN in order to improve relations with 
Southeast Asian states and show its support for regional cooperation. In fact, China and 
ASEAN agreed to sign the Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea 
(DoC) in 2002. This was a landmark treaty where all sides put opinions aside to frame a 
common language for regional security and cooperation; however there has been little 
traction to expand cooperative initiatives after ratification. Although there is a lack of 
clarity as to what China’s intentions are for the SCS, Taylor Fravel argues that the DoC 
signing created “breathing space that might be exploited to reduce the competition over 
maritime rights” but cautions political will and diplomatic creativity is necessary for this 
initiative to move forward.
25
 Further, Zou Keyuan argues “the recent change of China’s 
posture, from sticking to bilateral talks to accommodating the whole ASEAN region, has 
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paved the way for reaching a joint development arrangement in the future.”
26
 Regardless, 
China’s commitment to a regionally-focused solution is still viewed with mixed feelings 
as the other claimant states are concerned that China’s real intentions are to unilaterally 
control the SCS as part of their maritime strategy.    
IMPACT OF RESOURCE NATIONALISM ON RESOURCE-SHARING AND OTHER 
ECONOMIC FACTORS ON JOINT DEVELOPMENT OPPORTUNITIES 
 
Maritime disputes have intensified with the discovery of substantial seabed oil 
and gas in the region. Consequently, resource-sharing has not been viewed as an 
acceptable option among claimant states for certain reasons. In particular, the existence of 
oil and gas not only intensified competition, but also adversely influenced a claimant 
state’s willingness to enter into a resource-sharing agreement.
27
 The emergence of 
resource competition has transformed the SCS and other regional waters into a maritime 
zone of energy nationalism. In an effort to define and track this transformation, Andrew 
Erickson and Gabe Collins identified key criteria, such as state flagging of oil tankers, the 
acquisition of additional military systems to protect resources and transit routes, 
intensified maritime surveillance programs, and more assertive air and naval posturing 
near offshore resource zones and key seal lanes.
28
 Collectively, these key indicators 
provide a scorecard for each claimant state and other Asian states regarding their level of 
risk to triggering conflict. Unsurprisingly, China, India, Japan and Vietnam are the high-
risk states capable of sparking conflict. Also, the expansion of Asian national oil 
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companies (NOCs) continues to fuel resource competition. Because Asian NOCs are 
located in large oil and gas-importing states, their primary focus rests on acquiring oil 
and gas-producing assets abroad and securing long-term supplies – both onshore and 
offshore. This directly impacts resource-sharing opportunities in the SCS where these 
NOCs seek to securitize resources to bolster their nation’s domestic oil and gas 
production as well as improve economic performance at home.
29
  
In the event that joint development is feasible, there are other factors that could 
derail ratification. A contentious issue among other JDAs was resolving issues on the 
equitable split of resources and revenues. Also, the creation of a sustainable framework is 
critical for a JDA to garner support from investors, IOCs and even claimant states. 
Finally, joint development has to address preexisting rights issues where some oil and gas 
companies might already be involved in offshore activities that are slated to be 
designated as a JDZ.  
The discovery of hydrocarbons drives resource nationalism  
Because the Asian-Pacific region is more import-dependent, energy security is 
viewed as a strategic vulnerability.
30
 With the discovery of oil and gas deposits, claimant 
states have an option to develop resources that closer to market and curb ever-increasing 
import-bills. However, resource-sharing has not been overwhelming supported due to 
fears of ceding sovereign control over seabed resources.
31
 Further, China released oil and 
gas estimates for SCS that put its reserve potential on par with that of the Persian Gulf. 
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These estimates have not been confirmed and with little seismic mapping of the region’s 
reservoirs, it is difficult to discern if estimates are accurate. Nevertheless, the publication 
of these estimates have politicized SCS disputes and intensified competition among 
claimant states. In fact, China, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia, which already 
have substantial offshore operations, have reiterated their intent to expand further into the 
disputed areas. When considering assets and operational capacity, China remains the 
dominant regional energy producer where it obtains 15 percent of its domestic oil 
production, more than 600,000 barrels per day (bpd), from offshore fields.
32
 China’s three 
major oil and gas companies – PetroChina, China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation 
(SINOPEC), and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) have shown their 
international dominance in the last decade through the purchase of onshore and offshore 
acreage and other major assets. These companies carry the mandate of China’s 
government, which has voiced its willingness to expand further out into the SCS.   
This is not reflective of all areas of dispute where hydrocarbons are present. For 
instance, Malaysia’s discovery of gas deposits in a disputed area with Vietnam pushed 
both states towards joint development. In fact, these states expressed a real willingness to 
negotiate by suspending all exploration and exploitation activities at the time 
negotiations.
33
 Also, the Australia-Indonesia Timor Gap Treaty was initiated due to the 
discovery of hydrocarbons near Timor Gap area in which both parties (later East Timor) 
negotiated a JDZ to extract seabed oil and gas.
34
 These examples illustrate that the 
discovery of hydrocarbons does not necessarily result in a zero-sum approach, but can 
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ignite tensions among claimants, especially if these hydrocarbons are in close proximity 
to their refineries and domestic markets.   
Asian NOCs and their sphere of influence  
 Beyond the consortium of Chinese NOCs involved in the region, other claimant 
states like Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines are focused on pursuing new energy 
resources in the SCS. Mikkal Herberg contends there are two forces driving the push 
abroad by Asian NOCs. First, energy security concerns are growing across the region as 
dependence on imported oil and gas accelerates and second, the growing apprehension 
over the vulnerability of Asian economies to supply disruptions, scarcity, rising prices, 
and economic damage.
35
 Herberg further argues that “energy security has moved to the 
top of the economic and strategic agenda in Asia and has led to a surge of old-fashioned 
mercantilism, with governments supporting and encouraging their NOCS to go abroad to 
secure ‘national control’ of overseas oil and gas resources.”
36
 This is also linked to 
current economic conditions in Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia, where soaring 
food prices, weakening confidence in their currencies and a stagnating job market are 
forcing their governments and NOCs to find and develop new energy resources, 
including the SCS.
37
 One ASEAN diplomat voiced his concern in a recent interview with 
the International Crisis Group stating that “eventually, some country will need to drill for 
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Revenue and resource-sharing issues    
Many JDAs have revenue-sharing clauses for parties involved. Wendy Duong 
states that the negotiations process faces obstacles over the percentages of profit, control 
mechanism for stakeholders, and a consensual legal and administrative system to 
accommodate each state.
39
 Fiscal provisions between states and oil companies are also 
important. Commercial investors require clarity on governance issues before entering an 
agreement to explore and develop these resources. In the case of the SCS, certain 
claimant states, like China and Vietnam have attempted to maintain complete control 
over resources, which presents unfavorable terms for IOCs to enter an agreement.
40
 That 
said, there are examples like the 2002 Australia-East Timor JDA were a 90:10 split was 
agreed upon in favor of East Timor. This agreement had unique circumstances as the 
rationale behind this uneven split was to provide incentives for East Timor to participate 
in a JDA. Thus, an inequitable split in revenue does not necessarily inhibit JDA 
negotiations, but most JDAs solicit equitable resource sharing provisions. For example, in 
the Malaysia-Vietnam 1992 JDA, all costs incurred and benefits derived from the 
exploration and exploitation of petroleum in the defined area have been shared equally by 
both states.
41
 Although PETRONAS undertakes production sharing contracts (PSC) in 
the “defined area” it remits PETROVIETNAM an equal share of net revenue free of any 
taxes, levies or duties.
42
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JDAs are also capital-intensive operations and to efficiently exploit deepwater oil 
and gas, advanced technology, capital, and technical expertise are required.
43
 Since Asian 
NOCs lack the capital and technical skills for these complex projects, IOCs are seen as 
critical players to assist in guiding future development.
44
 However, IOCs are reluctant to 
invest in disputed areas where political and legal uncertainties exist and hesitate to 
undertake additional risk in an already capital-intensive operation. IOCs have attempted 
to lead exploration and production operations in the SCS only to withdraw due to 
ongoing territorial disputes. Another reason for withdrawing is due to China’s assertive 
behavior. Since 2007, the Chinese government has repeatedly warned oil companies that 
cooperated with Vietnam in the SCS would affect their business with China. As a foreign 
energy analyst explained in Vietnam, “when push comes to shove, none of the foreign oil 
and gas companies are going to risk their business in China for something small in 
Vietnam.”
45
 In the absence of IOC support, Dini Djalal argues claimant states, like 
Indonesia are unprepared to finance offshore oil and gas development. Because Indonesia 
depends on offshore development to bolster their revenues, the absence of foreign 
investment and technical advice impedes its economic recovery.
46
 This is where joint 
development represents a viable option to reduce project costs by utilizing IOCs, their 
investment dollars as well as their management and technical expertise to build-out these 
projects.     
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Preexisting rights within joint development zones   
Another obstacle to JDA implementation is preexisting rights in a future 
designated JDZ. Preexisting rights are rights granted unilaterally by states prior to the 
establishment of the JDZ to IOCs and NOCs for future exploration and production.
47
 
These preexisting rights can serve as an obstacle to joint development, especially if 
existing right holders refuse to give up their holdings. This was an issue for the Malaysia-
Thailand JDA where both parties negotiated separate joint agreements between 
PETRONAS (Malaysia) and PTT (Thailand), which took control over the permit licenses 
and concessions from Texas Pacific Oil. Although a resolution was reached in 1974, it 
serves as a reminder that preexisting rights must be addressed in regions slated as a JDZ 
where oil and gas companies might already be operating.
48
  
VOLATILE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE: A REGION OF DISPUTES AND TENSION 
The existence of international law does not prevent states from acting in self-
interest. As Craig Snyder argues, when states adopt a zero-sum approach over access to 
resources, joint development is objectionable.
49
 This is attributed not only to a long 
history of confrontation, but also poor bilateral relations, the rise of nationalism, and 
China’s assertive behavior in the region. Further, public perception influences 
governments or political parties. Failure to address public opinion or choosing to adopt a 
strategy of appeasement has been fiercely opposed and has led to nation-wide protests 
and demonstrations. Finally, involvement of the United States has been standoffish and 
tepid. Resolving such disputes is in its national security interests; however, the United 
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States has made a calculated decision to minimize its influence to avoid fracturing its 
relationship with China and potentially escalating tensions in the region. 
A history of disputes, tensions, and confrontation 
 The beginning of tensions and disputes over the SCS and its geographical features 
followed the conclusion of World War II when China claimed the Spratly Islands as an 
extension of its Guangdong province in 1946.
50
 After the Japanese empire was dissolved 
so to were all its SCS claims, which then opened the door for other claimants, like 
Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia to submit their own claims. Since the 1970s, 
there have been numerous incidents where open-water confrontations occurred between 
these claimant states. Most notably, China’s occupation of the Paracel Islands in 1974, 
the bloody naval skirmish between Chinese and Vietnamese sailors in 1988, the Chinese 
capture of Philippine military installments in the Philippine-claimed Mischief reef in the 
Spratlys in 1995, and the clash between Philippine troops and Chinese fisherman near the 
island of Palawan have come to symbolize the ongoing struggle to control the region.
51
 
With the discovery of hydrocarbons, the stakes grew as the claimants became more 
assertive and were unwilling to cede sovereign control. William J. Fallon, a retired four-
star admiral who headed the U.S. Pacific Command from 2005 until 2007 contends that 
Beijing’s view of disputed waters is not just an arena for nationalist flag-waving, but is 
indispensable to its future economic stability. “The potential for what lies beneath the sea is 
clearly a big motivator in a recent shift by China to a more pugnacious posture in the South 
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China Sea.”52 This shift in strategy left the other claimant states concerned that without U.S. 
support, the Chinese might be able to seize control of the entire SCS without a much 
resistance.  
The influence of public opinion and nationalist sentiment 
A misconception with the general public is that joint development means 
sacrificing state sovereignty. This rhetoric threatens resource-sharing, especially where 
political decisions are in line with public opinion.
53
 Sam Batemen argues that nationalism 
can “destroy political will and militate against cooperation and dialogue that might be 
perceived as compromising national sovereignty.”
54
 Clive Schofield states in a tense 
climate, “claims to the sovereignty of islands can be important symbolically, perhaps 
especially in times of national difficulty.”
55
 This is reflective of the current tensions in the 
Spratly and Paracel Islands where claimant states attempt to control its features in part 
due to national interests and perceived sovereign rights. In contrast, adopting a passive 
stance to such disputes has lead to public backlash who view a government’s strategy of 
appeasement as weak and a sign of vulnerability. Public opinion naturally influences a 
leader or political parties’ decision-making abilities when under intense domestic 
pressure. In the case of the SCS, leadership’s attitudes over disputes tend to align with the 
prevailing domestic sentiment.
56
 Such attitudes are reinforced by a fear that adopting 
resource-sharing options, like a JDA, might lead to protests and demonstrations by its 
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electorate and could fracture allegiances within the political party. Further, the media has 
played a powerful role in stoking nationalist sentiments in an effort to convince the public 
that joint development is too conciliatory and a form of capitulation of what is their 
territory and resources.
57
 The media continues to reinforce the importance of nationalism 
to apply more pressure on their leaders and political parties.     
Political willingness and the existence of good bilateral relations 
Another obstacle to resource-sharing is the political willingness of governments. 
In times of political stability, states favor JDA arrangements. Ian Townsend-Gault and 
William Stormont argues that consent between states must be achieved otherwise it is 
“merely redrafting the problem and complicating it further.”
58
 They further argue that 
political will of governments are the “single most important ingredient in the successful 
conclusion and continuation” of any joint development arrangement.
59
 Other scholars 
argue that political will requires clarity on the factors that define it. For instance, Hasjim 
Dalal argues that states are different from one another – in land size, population, and per 
capita income – and these differences weigh on a state’s willingness to participate in 
cooperative arrangements.
60
 It also means that with varying political systems it serves to 
influence a claimant state’s interpretation of disputes. Chidinma Bernadine Okafor agrees 
that governments are sensitive to these factors and must “withstand domestic upheavals 
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like change in government or internal strife between both states” for JDAs to succeed.
61
 
For example, implementation of the 1979/1990 Malaysia-Thailand JDA was delayed 
years due to regime change. In Thailand, the new government was unwilling to get 
involved in a scheme that might not be favored by future governments.
62
 Ultimately, a 
desire to access resources outweighed the political obstacles and through years of 
negotiations, Malaysia and Thailand reached an agreement. As Peter Reid argues, joint 
development is not effective without a determined exercise of political will by the 
governments and political parties involved.
63
  
Good bilateral relations are also a critical component for JDA success. In fact, 
JDAs are often pursued during periods of good bilateral relations between states. The 
1979/1990 Malaysia-Thailand JDA and the 1992 Malaysia-Vietnam JDA were 
implemented in these times of good relations and was a major incentive for other regional 
states to negotiate JDAs.
64
 Conversely, in times of conflict, the souring of bilateral 
relations dissuades states from cooperating and pursuing resource-sharing opportunities. 
In the context of the SCS, there is a history of confrontation and tension that extends back 
decades. Although this has not resulted in widespread conflict between claimants, there 
have been instances where violent skirmishes have occurred. Provided there is an 
underlying fragility to diplomatic relations in this region, the presence of hydrocarbons 
has only intensified ongoing disputes that could blow over if cooperation and conflict-
resolution strategies are not adopted.  
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China’s coercive diplomacy and assertive behavior  
Patrick Cronin contends “China is pursuing a policy of tailored coercion in the 
East and South China Seas that is destabilizing the Asia-Pacific region and spurring 
maritime competition.”
65
 Although other claimant states also seek to advance their 
maritime and territorial claims, China’s behavior is uniquely escalatory and revisionist. 
Further, Cronin points out that China “is refining coercive diplomatic instruments of 
power to assert its maritime reach and alter the administrative status quo in the Western 
Pacific. This behavior is being executed through a series of policy pronouncements, 
domestic laws and maritime operations in and around its near seas.”
66
 Such assertive 
attitudes has been influenced by Chinese ‘triumphalism’ in the wake of the 2008 
Olympics and the global financial crisis, growing Chinese nationalism, enhanced Chinese 
military and maritime capabilities, bureaucratic politics and competition, dependence on 
energy imports and external responses to internal sources of instability.
67
  
Collectively, these factors have helped formulate China’s coercive diplomacy as a 
means to addressing the SCS disputes and projecting power in the region. In fact, China 
is seeking to revise the situation in Asia through a variety of means designed to exert 
maximum influence without crossing the military threshold. Those means include 
proclaiming ownership over the SCS in contravention of UNCLOS; announcing fishing 
regulations that could justify Chinese action against other claimants; undertaking frequent 
military and civilian law enforcement patrols in and around the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu 
Islands in Chinese); pressuring a Philippine withdrawal from Scarborough Reef in the 
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SCS and then achieving de facto control over the reef.
68
 All things considered, the 
concept of joint development seems above all else, a distant reality in the presence of 
China’s assertiveness and maritime strategy set on controlling the SCS.  
Implications of U.S. intervention  
 The U.S. fleet has adopted a maritime strategy focused on protecting global 
seaborne trade. In the 2007 maritime strategy titled, A cooperated Strategy for 21
st
 
Century Seapower (CS-21), the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard vowed to 
“join with other like-minded nations to protect and sustain the global, interconnected 
system through which [we] prosper.”
69
 However, such a strategy faces fierce opposition 
from China, where political, economic and military power continues to grow. The 
Chinese are highly sensitive to U.S. intervention and view this as a means of containing 
its rightful aspirations. China views the SCS as their domain with indisputable sovereign 
rights to all its geographical features. The critical nature of the SCS to Chinese national 
security interests was reinforced by Wu Shengli, commander of the People’s Liberation 
Army Navy. Shengli retorted “how would you feel if I cut off your arms and legs? That’s 
how China feels about the South China Sea.”
70
 As a result, any discussion of intervention 
has been avoided by successive U.S. presidents because of the potential ramifications, 
especially to its growing economic relationship with China. Although it is in the U.S. 
national interests to protect the sovereign interests of its regional allies, the United States 
is reluctant to get involved in these territorial disputes. Rather, the United States has 
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enhanced other regional militaries, including Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam. To 
date, this has been successful, but it has also raised concerns in China who see this as an 
indirect threat to its desires to control the seabed resources. 
71
Nonetheless, there are 
significant constraints to intervention and Washington has put an emphasis on utilizing 
diplomatic channels to work towards resolving regional disputes.  
However, President Obama’s recent visit to Japan provided a dramatic shift in its 
stance over maritime disputes. Although President Obama reiterated Washington’s 
refusal to take sides in the sovereignty dispute and called on China and Japan to resolve 
their differences through dialogue, he reinforced U.S. commitment to Japan’s national 
security. President Obama stated “our commitment to Japan’s security is absolute and 
article five [of the security treaty] covers all territories under Japan’s administration, 
including the Senkaku islands,” Further, he stated that the United States does not have a 
position on the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands, but agreed that historically these 
islands have been administered by Japan and as a result, should remain under their 
control.
72
 This statement signified a shift in the administration’s stance on territorial 
disputes and might be viewed by the Chinese as a form of political provocation.   
IS JOINT DEVELOPMENT A VIABLE OPTION FOR THE SOUTH CHINA SEA? 
As Clive Schofield points out that joint development is not a “solution to a 
jurisdictional problem and should not be seen as a panacea to all problems associated 
with overlapping maritime claims.”
73
 JDAs were not designed to resolve longstanding 
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disputes, but are more of an interim mechanism to diffuse tensions in order to rebuild 
trust and strengthen relations through the joint development of resources. This concept 
embodies international principles of conflict resolution and cooperation; however, it is 
not mandatory under international maritime law so its success hinges upon a state’s 
willingness to cooperate and enter into a JDA arrangement. In fact, JDAs have been 
successful between IOCs and NOCs in the form of joint ventures and claimant states in 
Africa, South America, Europe and Asia. However, the SCS presents a wide-array of 
legal, economic and political obstacles that complicate any future JDA prospects. 
The most glaring obstacle to JDA implementation is the current political climate. 
During times of peace and stability, JDAs have been successfully implemented in East 
Asia, the Gulf of Thailand, and East Timor. In these arrangements, claimants shelved 
disputes to proceed with resource-sharing negotiations. In most cases, negotiations faced 
obstacles, but the willingness of leadership and their governments to resolve 
disagreements proved to be the driving factor for success. In addition, good bilateral 
relations and positive public opinion of joint development helped policymakers on both 
sides adopt this JDA without fear of domestic upheaval.  
The bigger question is if the JDA concept is applicable to the SCS. To further 
understand the region’s political climate, the thesis explores the 2008 Japan-China 
Principal Consensus (2008 Principled Consensus) in the neighboring ECS and analyzes 
what factors played a critical role in this JDA’s ratification. Further, tensions similarly 
escalated in the ECS due to ongoing disputes over the Senkaku-Daioyu Islands. As a 
result, bilateral relations have deteriorated and have inflamed nationalistic sentiments. 




adopted assertive attitudes in part from domestic pressures. This case study provides a 
timely comparative analysis to SCS and offers a similar geopolitical situation. Finally, the 
ECS also contains significant offshore oil and gas resources. Preliminary estimates are 
comparable to the SCS and could provide China and Japan with ample supply in the 
coming decades that are in close proximity to their refineries and domestic markets.
74
   
CASE STUDY: 2008 JAPAN-CHINA PRINCIPLED CONSENSUS IN THE EAST CHINA SEA 
 
This thesis attempts to explore how the political factors influenced the outcome of 
this JDA. By examining the 2008 Principled Consensus, the thesis illustrates how 
political factors, ranging from nationalism to political will of leadership have complicated 
both the negotiation and ratification process. It is important to note that there were 
various legal and economic issues that served as obstacles to the 2008 Principled 
Consensus. On the legal side, the intractability of sovereignty and maritime delimitation 
issues persisted throughout negotiations and were a point of contention. As for the 
economic issues, the discovery of natural gas ignited tensions, but also raised 
disagreements over the equitable split of the giant Chunxiao gas field. Alone, these legal 
and economic obstacles inhibited negotiations process; however, the current political 
climate proved to be the most influential factor in determining the final outcome of the 
2008 Principled Consensus. In fact, the combination of political factors almost upended 
negotiations and eventual ratification. Although it is argued that political will of Sino-
Japanese leadership proved to be the most critical component to pave the way for the 
2008 Principled Consensus ratification, other political factors, including public opinion, 
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resource competition, nationalism, and diplomatic relations also played a critical role in 
the process.  
A historical perspective of the 2008 Principled Consensus  
There were three reasons why China and Japan initially decided to negotiate a 
JDA arrangement in the ECS. First, the Chinese had carried out unilateral exploration 
operations of Chunxiao (Shirabaka in Japanese) oil and gas fields. According to the 
Japanese, exploration and production operations were located close to the median line 
claimed by Japan. Although the Chunxiao gas field was on the Chinese side of the 
boundary, Japan insisted that some of gas was located on their side of demarcation line 
and feared the Chinese were stealing their natural gas.
75
 Second, an increase of Chinese 
naval patrols in disputed areas raised concerns with Japanese leadership and its electorate 
that China was becoming more assertive over its claims in the area. Third, relations 
improved between states following the resignation Junichiro Koizumi, a self-proclaimed 
nationalist.
76
 Thus, in 2004, Japan and China began negotiations to jointly develop 
seabed oil and gas in this disputed area. Both claimant states agreed to set aside a 
disputed offshore block and designate a JDZ for future exploration and production. The 




After years of negotiations, China and Japan reached a “Principled Consensus on 
the East China Sea Issue,” which included provisions for the joint development of 
offshore oil and gas. Although this was considered a landmark agreement, Guo Rongxing 
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argued that it did not resolve the wider conflict over territorial disputes. Rongxing stated, 
“international conflict is due to a perpetually self-reinforcing dynamic: one side responds 
to the other’s last provaction with a new provocation of its own.”
78
 In this case, 
provocations were exacerbated by tactical asymmetry and nationalist politics where 
China and Japan continued to unilaterally exploit the hydrocarbon deposits and adopt 
uncompromising attitudes during territorial-dispute negotiations. Consequently, the 2008 
Principled Consensus did not strengthen Sino-Japanese relations as the signing 
precipitated confrontational rhetoric and assertive attitudes on both sides. In fact, China 
and Japan presented conflicting interpretations over provisions in the 2008 Principled 
Consensus, citing an unwillingness to renegotiate to overcome these differences. 
Specifically, the Chunxiao field was at the center of the debate. China viewed the 
Chunxiao gas fields within its sovereignty and argued it should not be included with the 
JDA. On the other hand, Japan regarded the Chunxiao field a critical part of the 2008 
Principled Consensus.
79
 Moreover as the political climate deteriorated with territorial 
disputes in the neighboring Senkaku-Daioyu Islands, both states sought to ramp up 
efforts to strengthen nationalist sentiments as a means of provocation. Nonetheless, the 
Senkaku-Daioyu island disputes did complicate efforts to implement the JDA in the ECS 
as it led to more intense and frequent demonstrations and protests in China and Japan.  
The public viewed the territorial disputes with a similar zero-sum perspective. 
The idea of surrendering sovereignty over resources was unacceptable as the JDA 
concept was seen as too conciliatory. As a result, demonstrations and protests put 
considerable pressure on both central governments during the JDA negotiations. 
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Sensitivities over sovereignty were reinforced by Chinese and Japanese media as a tool to 
intensify negative sentiments of JDA arrangements.
80
 Inevitably, the success of any JDA 
requires political willingness of parties and governments that must “withstand domestic 
upheavals such as change in government or internal strife between both states.”
81
 In this 
instance, China and Japan were willing to negotiate and reach an agreement in 2008; 
however, the absence of sustained political will allowed the agreement stall out as it 
failed to reach the end goal. In fact, relations further soured as they willingly used public 




Negative public opinion and the rise of nationalism   
There has been a long history of tensions and disputes between China and Japan 
that is cross-generational and influences public perception. Although nationalist 
sentiments can lie dormant, these maritime disputes have ignited flag-waving protests and 
demonstrations due to long-standing fears and mistrust between these regional powers. 
On one hand, the Japanese viewed Chinese efforts to exploit resources in the ECS as part 
of a strategy called “creeping expansionism” where China seeks to exert its influence and 
power past Japan into the Pacific Ocean.
83
 Such fears were reinforced by the expansion 
of Chinese maritime power through its efforts to build-up naval capabilities. This sparked 
protests in Japan, who feared that creeping expansionism posed a serious threat to their 
national security. Conversely, China viewed Japan’s activist posture over the region’s 
maritime domain and involvement in jurisdiction disputes as a dominant threat to its 
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national security. If anything, public perception illustrates how deep-seeded mistrust and 
fear persists despite the ratification of the 2008 Principled Consensus. And it is a natural 
tendency for these governments to make decisions under the influence of prevailing 
grievances. Unfortunately, these grievances threaten to jeopardize the JDA process where 
ongoing territorial disputes are inextricably linked to the control over seabed resources.
84
 
Historically, protests and demonstrations have fueled nationalism in China and 
Japan and influenced policymakers. Since the mid-1990s, both states antagonized each 
other by sending naval, coast guard and seismic surveying vessels into disputed waters as 
a means of intimidation. Prior to the 2008 Principled Consensus, there were multiple 
attempts by activists in Taiwan and Hong Kong to occupy the Senkaku-Daioyu Islands in 
response to then Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to the controversial Yakusuni 
Shrine. In response, the Japanese arrested Taiwanese fisherman and sent Japanese coast 
guard vessels to the disputed islands.
85
 Back in China, Honda, Nissan and Toyota 
reported massive drop-offs in automotive sales due to a boycott of Japanese imports and 
wide-spread protests where rioters even smashed Japanese cars and torched dealerships 
across the country.
86
 These events were a result of hardened nationalist sentiments and a 
tit-for-tat posture that led to open-seas confrontation over disputed geographical features. 
James Manicom argued that the reason for delaying the 2008 Principled Consensus 
ratification was due to domestic reactions in China.
87
 Although protests were controlled 
by Chinese authorities, nationalists within the government influenced the terms of the 
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agreement, particularly the first clause under which China agreed to a JDZ that straddled 
Japan’s median line. In Japan, protests and demonstrations were aimed at applying 
pressure on their government to adopt a more assertive policy towards these maritime 
disputes. As a result, a growing anti-Chinese sentiment in Japan took hold following the 
signing of the 2008 Principled Consensus as the electorate criticized the Han 
administration for its handling of the disputes.
88
 Sovereignty and jurisdictional disputes 
have always carried a level of political sensitivity; however with seabed oil and gas 
deposits added to the mix, such sensitivities were elevated due to energy scarcity fears 
and concerns over sovereign rights to these resources. It also invigorated the media to 
pressure governments to be confrontational in the ECS disputes.
89
 In the past, disputes 
created small crises in the Sino-Japanese relationship that were tempered by strong 
leadership and political willingness to diffuse tensions.
 90
 Today, this is markedly 
different as leaders are more susceptible to domestic fallout for adopting a conciliatory 
approach as negative approval ratings could forcibly oust leaders and their ruling party.  
Regarding ECS disputes, nationalism intensified following the breakdown of 
negotiations over claims to the Chunxiao gas fields. Without consensus over how the 
Chunxiao gas fields could be jointly managed, nationalist sentiment intensified over fears 
that any agreement to cooperate or share resources would mean conceding sovereignty. 
For instance, in China, the 2008 Principled Consensus was criticized by the public on the 
grounds that China was compromising too much by allowing Japan to develop the 
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Chunxiao gas field. Whereas in Japan, people were angered that Japanese companies 
involved in the development of the Chunxiao field had to abide Chinese law and be 
labeled as “foreign enterprises” in offshore operations.
91
 This influenced how both 
delegations interpreted the 2008 Principled Consensus, especially as public opinion on 
joint development grew more negative. As Mark Valencia states, “the key problem lies 
not so much with governments but with nationalist political constituencies in each state 
and the pressures that they can bring to bear...”
92
 To date, leadership on both sides have 
not been able to temper nationalism, which does not bode well for the long-term outlook 
for this JDA.   
The political will of leadership and political parties  
The political will of parties and leadership play a critical role in deciding the fate 
of the JDA process. In this case, the political will of parties and leadership have been 
inconsistent often having reservations during negotiations for fear of public backlash and 
disapproval among party hardliners. Another reason for inconsistency is the change of 
leadership that negatively impacted the negotiations of the 2008 Principled Consensus. 
As seen in other JDA arrangements, like the 1979/1990 Malaysia-Thailand JDA, the 
resilience of new regime even in the face of domestic political changes, proved to be vital 
to the success of this arrangement. As David Ong argues, both states circumvented 
differences in legal interpretation of petroleum resource development and minimized 
domestic political influence to continue negotiations. It also showed that political 
willingness from both sides was driven by the desire to derive the benefits rather than 
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engage in a wasteful diplomatic stalemate.
93
 In contrast, the 2008 Principled Consensus 
was only possible because of the change in Japanese leadership following the resignation 
of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. It was then that the Chinese were willing to 
renegotiate the terms to reach an agreement. The fragility of political willingness is 
highlighted by the change of leadership where the election of a nationalistic leader in one 
country can force their counterpart to become equally assertive to counter a perceived 
threat to its national security.
94
 That said, there is a distinct difference in Malaysian-Thai 
and Sino-Japanese leadership. Most obvious is there are layers of mistrust, animosity and 
historical grievances attached to the already fragile and fractured Sino-Japanese 
relationship. Although not visible, these grievances are omnipresent and can resurface 
with ferocity when maritime disputes, such as the Senkaku-Daioyu islands, emerge.  
Strong leadership is integral for resolving disputes and developing real resource-
sharing opportunities, but China and Japan were strongly influenced by domestic 
pressures and this has a lasting impact on the integrity of the JDA and agreed upon 
provisions. Sino-Japanese leadership was able to reach an agreement on the 2008 
Principled Consensus even in the presence of strong public opposition. To reach 
ratification, eleven rounds of director-general level discussions and ministerial and 
executive level meetings were required. Then Chinese Prime Minister Hu Jintao and 
Japanese Prime Minister Fakuda Tasuo pledged that this agreement would make the ECS 
a “sea of peace, cooperation, and friendship.”
95
 At first glance, the political will of 
leadership seemed responsible for reaching this agreement; however, there was little 
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substance to the agreement, especially when examining the provisions for the JDZ.  In 
fact, vague wording on the principles of joint development and a lack of commitment by 
both sides left Japan with a non-binding legally agreement with China. Further, no 
official signatures of the participating officials were required and the treaty does not even 
have a title as most do. The outpouring of media coverage made the 2008 Principled 
Consensus seem like a landmark event; however, such a provisional agreement remained 
dependent on sustained political will of leaders to ensure joint development could be 
realized.
96
 Unfortunately, there was a strong difference of interpretation and little 
recourse by either side to reconcile differences. Shortly after ratifying the 2008 Principled 
Consensus, China and Japan carried out unilateral activities in the disputed ECS.
97
 This 
not only escalated tensions, but it signified a lack of political will to renew negotiations 
and a failure to be more cooperative. There was a lot of finger pointing on both sides over 
who was responsible for a breakdown in the 2008 Principled Consensus and this has led 
to a diplomatic stalemate that now has put the JDA in jeopardy of failing to achieve its 
end goal.   
Sino-Japanese leadership became more assertive in negotiations partly because of 
the sensitivities over the control of seabed natural gas. China was reluctant to accept the 
JDZ location which straddled a median line and was a point of contention with the public 
that viewed this as too conciliatory to Japanese interests. The development of Chunxiao 
gas fields created new friction on both sides as there was no agreement on what 
percentage of the profits Japanese entities were entitled to. To date, no Japanese entity 
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has stepped forward and expressed any interest in participating in the venture because of 
the risks and sensitivities of involvement.
98
 The reality is that neither Chinese nor 
Japanese leadership can reach a consensus on an equitable spit of revenues and resources. 
Instead, an assertive response only reinforces the struggle of national interests and efforts 
to control these natural resources.
 99
 As Céline Pajon discusses, adhering to these attitudes 
will escalate tensions, radicalize leadership, and create more regional instability, where 
Japan will become more defensive towards Chinese encroachment and in turn, might 
influence future Japanese leaders to become more conservative and nationalistic.
100
  
The importance of good bilateral relations 
 In the presence of good bilateral relations, the JDA concept is a viable resource-
sharing option for claimant states. This paper examined examples where good relations 
among claimants paved the way for JDA implementation in disputed areas. However, in 
the presence of ongoing tensions, JDAs are shelved as national security interests take 
precedent. In the case of the 2008 Principled Consensus, China and Japan were able to 
negotiate and reach an agreement after years of high level talks and improved relations. 
But, this was not a seamless process and if anything, illustrates how delicate Sino-
Japanese relations were even prior to negotiations. The fragility of relations weighs on 
China’s resentment and opposition towards Japan, both important elements to Chinese 
identity.
101
 For Japan, the policy shift away from restraint towards assertiveness was 
precipitated by fears of China’s political, military and economic rise throughout the 
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 In the events leading up to the 2008 Principled Consensus, bilateral relations 
deteriorated under the Japanese leadership of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. It was 
after his resignation that China reopened negotiations with the Abe administration who 
voiced a commitment to repair their damaged relationship. This paved the way for the 
2008 Principled Consensus, but it did not improve their fragile relationship. In fact, it 
highlighted the current positions of each state and left the door open to future 
disagreement in the event of a regime change.
103
 Consequently, improvements to bilateral 
relations were soon displaced by zero-sum ideologies where Japan and China carried out 
unilateral exploration and production and even threatened to engage one another in 
disputed waters. These actions sent mixed signals about the level of commitment to the 
JDA concept and reinforced mistrust over the real intent between claimants over 
maritime disputes. More damaging was Japan’s decision to purchase a number of the 
Senkaku-Daioyu islands from a private owner. Although there is debate over why Japan 
purchased these features, it created new frictions between these states. Céline Pajon 
argues that this might become the new status quo in the ECS where a radicalization of 
public opinion will drive politicians on both sides to be more assertive and adopt excesses 
of patriotism to diver the public’s attention for other issues and direct it towards each 
other.
104
 This political environment is clearly not conducive to rebuilding relations and 
will continue to inhibit JDA ratification. Moreover, the added domestic pressures put 
political parties and leadership in a bind and could force them to adopt an 
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uncompromising attitude on issues relating to national sovereignty. A growing challenge 
is if China and Japan can ease bilateral tensions without losing face, not only with its 
neighbor, but among their own electorate and political parties.  
In the end, Sino-Japanese relations will remain tense and will force policymakers 
on both sides to be more realistic about the outlook of managing issues of delimitation, 
sovereignty, and resource-sharing. Given these issues are politically sensitive and carry 
national importance, there are doubts if a JDA is achievable in the ECS where decision-
making is beholden to protecting national security interests. That said, China and Japan 
did successfully negotiate and ratify the 2008 Principled Consensus. In a hostile political 
climate, policymakers overcame adversity to reach an agreement. Inevitably, for this JDA 
to succeed Sino-Japanese leadership must adopt a more amicable and cooperative 
approach over disputes even in the presence of public opposition and seabed oil and gas 
resources.  
CONCLUSION 
Economic growth and demand for energy are the critical factors behind import-
dependent Asia-Pacific states to search for new sources of oil and gas, both at home and 
abroad. The maritime domain, once considered too expensive and remote for the 
extraction of seabed oil and gas, now represents one of the hottest areas of growth.  The 
SCS with its significant offshore reserves has come to symbolize a much-needed short-
term solution for the energy-starved region. However, the SCS is a highly-contested 
region where six states have claimed sovereignty and jurisdictional rights over its 




this means a strategy to curb tensions, rebuild cooperation, and promote resource-sharing 
should be explored to rebalance and strengthen regional stability.    
One strategy is the JDA, which is a provisional instrument designed to help 
claimants shelve intractable disputes in order to jointly development offshore resources. 
The JDA concept is an interim solution to long-standing maritime disputes and has been 
successfully implemented around the world in an effort to improve cooperation and 
enhance resource-sharing opportunities. Whether the JDA instrument is applicable in the 
SCS depends upon if certain legal, economic, and political obstacles can be overcome to 
open up channels for negotiation. Legal and economic obstacles, such as JDZ designation, 
sovereignty claims, preexisting rights, equitable revenue and resource-sharing, and 
management of operations all present significant issues, but they do not compare to the 
current political climate and its impact over JDA implementation.   
Collectively, these political obstacles are a real threat to JDA implementation and 
will put pressure on the concept’s effectiveness in a region where national interests and 
resource scarcity fears still reign supreme. In the case study, the thesis highlights how 
nationalism, resource competition, public perception, political will of leadership, and 
poor bilateral relations all played roles in the 2008 Principled Consensus. China and 
Japan were able to work towards establishing a JDA in the ECS and symbolized the first 
step towards building positive dialogue between two states with a long history of mistrust 
and animosity. However, erasing historical grievances and layers of mistrust is 
impossible and only reinforces that in a hostile political climate, JDA implementation can 
be difficult to accomplish. The rise of nationalism among hardliner politicians and public 




more frequent, policymakers became more attentive to domestic politics in their approach 
to maritime disputes. In particular, Sino-Japanese leadership reacted favorably to 
domestic pressures and adopted more assertive attitudes during negotiations. This 
aggressive stance also led to confrontations on the open seas where numerous clashes, 
including boat ramming, the arrest of fisherman, and disruption of oil and gas exploration 
and exploitation operations. Without question, an assertive strategy negatively impacts 
bilateral relations and fuels nationalism among the populous and policymakers. Leaders 
on both sides were pressured to satisfy JDA negotiations and appease their constituents 
and political parties at home. Unfortunately, the 2008 Principled Consensus has not led to 
the joint exploitation of seabed oil and gas and until relations normalize, joint production 
is unlikely to occur.  
There is direct correlation to the deteriorating political climate in the ECS and 
SCS with the exception of the number of claimant states involved in maritime disputes. 
With the addition of claimants, it does raise concerns over how effective JDAs could be 
in a region where there have not been any agreements on disputed areas or a willingness 
to shelve disputes. Since territorial disputes are more dangerous than other types of 
conflicts, the risk of escalation might occur if claimants continue to push to secure seabed 
resources.
105
 In fact, small confrontations have occurred between China, Vietnam, the 
Philippines and Indonesia, which all have substantial offshore operations in the region. 
Such confrontations are fueled by resource competition, but fortunately have not resulted 
in wider conflict. Despite the current political climate, claimant states have voiced their 
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confidence in regional solution to resolve ongoing disputes. China has strongly opposed 
the internationalization of the SCS disputes and has been more receptive to the creation 
of a regional authority to address maritime disputes and joint development opportunities. 
Whether this is reason to be optimistic remains to be seen especially since little traction 
on joint development has taken place thus far.    
In the end, JDA implementation depends on the political will of parties and 
governments to shelve sovereignty claims to pave the way for joint development and 
cooperation. At this time, resource-sharing is a distant reality and although JDAs are 
useful mechanisms, claimants are not obligated to enter into these arrangements. 
Provided the SCS contains overlapping territorial and maritime jurisdictional disputes, 
claimants have adopted a hardened approach over their claims following the discovery of 
hydrocarbons. That said, the JDA concept symbolizes more than just a pathway for 
cooperation and resource-sharing rather it is a mechanism designed to diffuse conflict and 
resolve longstanding disputes. In a region with significant oil and gas reserves, the 
utilization of resources serves to benefit all claimant states. If claimants truly seek a 
regionally-based resolution to tensions in the SCS, JDAs can be an effective strategy to 
exploit seabed oil and gas resources as well as rebuild trust and strengthen cooperation. 
However, the burden of responsibility falls on the claimant states, which have yet to 
embrace this provisional instrument. Instead, maritime disputes persist due to resource 
competition, nationalism, fears of losing sovereignty, and the lack of political support for 
resource-sharing. In the short-term, JDA implementation is unlikely to occur without 
sustained political will of leaders and governments and domestic support to shelve or 




cooperative efforts and rebuild confidence with the public, political parties and leadership. 
Also, there needs to be a reassessment about the importance of resource-sharing for this 
energy-starved region and its long-term benefits for all claimant states and their energy 
security concerns. It is critical to recognize that each claimant state can win by adopting 
joint development strategies opposed to further hardening their stance over this seabed oil 
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 The iconic image of the Arctic as a vast, ice-covered region is rapidly changing. 
There is no question that the driving force behind a dramatic environmental shift is global 
warming and climate change. In fact, the Arctic is warming twice as fast as anywhere 
else on Earth and the impacts are hard to ignore. The polar ice cap is 25 percent smaller 
today than it was in 1978 and summer ice continues to decrease at a rate of 12 percent per 
decade. Further, sea thickness has also decreased by 40 percent in the past couple decades, 
raising concerns among climatologists that the Arctic could reach a tipping point where it 
might become ice-free in twenty years.
106
   
 The retreat of sea ice is also driving economic activity. Following the release of 
its 2008 report, the United States Geological Survey (USGS) estimated that the Arctic 
contains 13 percent of the world’s remaining undiscovered oil, 30 percent of the 
undiscovered natural gas, and 20 percent of the undiscovered natural gas liquids (NGLs). 
Almost 84 percent of these hydrocarbons are located within territorial waters of littoral 
states.
107
 The resource potential has ignited what some have coined a “gold rush” as 
governments and the oil and gas industry have already invested billions into offshore 
projects.
108
 Coupled with the rapid decline of older oil and gas fields, the oil and gas 
industry is desperate to find new supply to replenish their reserve replacement ratios 
(RRR) and satisfy shareholders.
109
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Nevertheless, the Arctic has the potential to become a new frontier for future 
offshore development. However, the economic promise that the region holds does not 
come without certain risks. Beyond the fact the Arctic is a remote region with some of 
the harshest and most unpredictable weather conditions, global warming and climate 
change are rapidly altering the marine environment. Failing to respond to these risks will 
have consequences on this already fragile marine environment, but will also adversely 
impact the indigenous peoples and future prospects for offshore development. The reality 
is that to operate in the Arctic, the oil and gas industry will be required to invest heavily 
into hardened infrastructure, improved safety and spill response equipment and more 
extensive environmental impact studies. In response to Royal Dutch Shell’s (Shell) 
botched drilling campaign off the Alaskan coast last summer, there are concerns that 
there are significant gaps in existing governance and regulatory standards. There is a call 
to create a new convention that is inclusive and tackles a wide-array of emerging issues, 
like climate change and spill response strategies. The research question in the thesis asks 
how offshore oil and gas development should be governed in the Arctic and what 
framework can effectively tackle emerging environmental, economic, and political risks 
associated with large-scale development.  
 This thesis is divided into five sections. The first section provides a theoretical 
overview of global energy governance and outlines the debate behind its structure and 
capabilities. For the second section, the thesis examines existing legal regimes that 
address offshore oil and gas activities and also highlights some gaps in governance and 
regulation. The third section looks at the economic and environmental challenges to 




conditions and if energy geopolitics is a real threat that could create conflict between 
littoral states. Finally, the thesis suggests two governance pathways for the Arctic – a 
hard law or soft law instrument. The first governance option explores the legally binding 
treaty, Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) and the second option analyzes the Arctic Council 
(AC), an intergovernmental forum comprised of Arctic states, indigenous organizations, 
and non-member states. Separately, these options might provide a pathway to address 
emerging risks to offshore activities.   
ENERGY GOVERNANCE – ADDRESSING AND MANAGING COMPLEX ENERGY ISSUES 
 By definition, global energy governance is an institutional structure that facilitates 
the provision of global energy security in the absence of a global authority. However, this 
definition, fails to capture the complexities and interpretations of what role governance 
should play in an evolving energy world. Some scholars argue global energy governance 
has become too complex due to the presence of so many actors and interest groups as 
well as the emergence of complex energy issues.
110
 The combination of these factors 
make consensus on energy issues, like climate change or energy investment, difficult to 
achieve at the international level. In addition, socio-political shifts within the energy 
sector influence and mold new structures, like the transition from state-centric 
governance structures to multilayered and non-hierarchal structures.   
 Further, the global energy governance is designed to address complex energy 
issues that individual states might otherwise might not have the capacity to manage or 
resolve. This could include geopolitical, environmental or economic issues where 
international organizations like the International Energy Agency (IEA), the Energy Trade 
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Charter (ETC), the International Energy Forum (IEF), and the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), provide guidance and the capacity to address these issues. However, Ann Florini 
suggests that international organizations are often subdivided and might have limited 
abilities to address energy policy or technology transfer crosses national domains. In 
other words, limitations within the international structure do adversely impact the overall 
effectiveness and resoluteness of an institution or a convention.
111
 
Beyond deficiency issues, member states can lack coordination in tackling energy 
issues. In some instances, governments are unprepared to negotiate because they often 
lack a coherent strategy of how to address issues, like cross-border energy investments, 
energy inequality, and the mitigation of supply shock impacts. Andreas Goldthau argues 
that the global energy system “barely has clearly defined processes, rules for regulation, 
and interference.”
112
 Other experts view shortcomings differently, adding there is a 
misunderstanding of how energy governance is meant to function. On one side, states 
might perceive ‘effective’ global energy governance simply by the benefits received by 
providing their support while others might prefer regional or multilateral forums to 
address energy issues because they feel international regimes are exclusive or even 
ineffective. Thus, there is a lack of clarity as to what global energy governance ought to 
provide its member states. As the uses and types of energy evolve with demand, there is 
an urgency to engage in robust dialogue about the nature, scope and challenges of global 
energy governance. This could alleviate misconceptions by providing direction and 
definition of what global energy governance should mean to member states.  
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Reform of global energy governance is not a new phenomenon. But debate over 
where reforms are needed does remain contentious. Gilles Carbonnier argues that greater 
assistance from international organizations, transnational extractive industries, and 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) is required to help developing countries combat 
the resource curse.
113
 Carbonnier also contends that existing institutional architecture in 
the IEA, ECT, IEF, and WTO, is not designed to resolve peak oil, climate change, and 
resource curse. This is a result of the lack of coordinated action at the international level 
that reflects a widening gap between “geological temporality and realities and short-term 
time horizon presiding over politics and economic policymaking.”
114
  
Conversely, Oran Young views the increase of competing interests for resources 
as the more significant challenge to global energy governance. Young argues the ability 
for states to harmonize and implement provisions with consistency is one of the more 
difficult tasks within any global governance framework. Even more so, governance 
structures tend to be cost-intensive, time consuming, and expose externalities that further 
delay negotiation and ratification. These obstacles inhibit the development of cooperative 
arrangements and reinforce negative sentiment about the efficiency and practicality of 
these governing bodies.
115
 In particular, Young states that the exploitation of oil and gas 
perpetuates the complexities of governance at regional and state levels because it 
introduces a system of high politics where economics and politics of global energy 
markets are introduced that tend dominant negotiation.
116
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Equally important to global energy governance is the formation of regimes and 
how they are structured. Regimes are commonly defined as “sets of implicit or explicit 
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ 
expectations converge in a given area of international relations.”
117
 International treaties 
have also grown exponentially, which in turn creates an overcrowding of regimes that 
often overlap and address the same issues. When addressing and resolving “issues,” 
Robert Keohane argues that this should be “dealt with in common negotiations and by the 
same, or closely coordinated, bureaucracies.”
118
 However, at the international level, 
regimes focus on specific subject matter, narrower in scope than an issue. For instance, 
the energy regime complex is organized by sectors – oil, gas, coal, and renewables. 
Moreover, Daniel Drezner argues that regime complexes create ambiguity that often 
leads to strengthening the power asymmetries to favor powerful players.
119
 Other scholars 
contend the traditional definition of power is changing global governance with the 
emergence of non-state actors. The inundation of actors and their interests in the global 
governance system makes it difficult to manage transnational problems, like climate 
change, pollution, and energy investment. It also raises concerns about the validity of 
global governance when regional and multilateral regimes can effectively resolve similar 
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EXISTING MARITIME CONVENTIONS: ARE THEY EFFECTIVE AGENTS TO MANAGE 
AND ENFORCE OFFSHORE DEVELOPMENT? 
 
 The Arctic depends on legal regimes to protect marine ecosystems, regulate 
offshore oil and gas activities, and minimize offshore pollution. Some experts argue the 
current regimes – the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment (OSPAR), 
and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 73/74) – 
are sufficient mechanisms to regulate and manage offshore development. Other experts 
disagree, stating that not only are there gaps in governance and regulation within these 
regimes, but there is no global regulatory or governance body to monitor offshore 
hydrocarbon activities.
121
   
OSPAR’s uneven capacity to protect and govern marine environments  
An important regime to “prevent and eliminate marine pollution and achieve 
sustainable management of the maritime area” is the OSPAR convention.
122
 This 
convention has its own commission and full-time Secretariat that can adopt binding 
decisions and recommendations for prevention and elimination of pollution.
123
 Some 
experts argue that OSPAR is a model for a new Arctic regime, but Lousie Fayette argues 
that OSPAR fails to embrace an integrated ecosystems-approach.
124
 Through this 
approach, all economic activity is monitored and regulated under one umbrella and in 
parts of the world has been an effective strategy to improve overall marine management 
and protect surrounding ecosystems. However, an integrated ecosystems-approach has 
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yet been fully implemented in the Arctic. More concerning, the World Wildlife Fund 
(WWF) reported that the United States, Russia, and Canada have not ratified OSPAR and 
without their support, OSPAR’s effectiveness to prevent marine pollution, enforce 
ecosystem protection, and control offshore operations remains quite limited.  
Outer continental shelves disputes and delay of US ratification of UNCLOS 
With over 157 signatories, UNCLOS is one of the most important international 
regimes “where division of ocean space, sovereign rights over ocean resources, 
protection of the marine environment, and the conduct of activities in and under the 
world’s oceans” are governed.
125
 In the case of the Arctic, most offshore oil and gas is 
located within national exclusive economic zones (EEZs), leaving most legal disputes in 
the outer continental shelves (OCS). Peter Ripley argues that beyond 200 nautical miles 
the situation has become complicated as UNCLOS allows Arctic states to submit claims 
of the natural prolongation of their OCS. Approval ultimately falls on the Commission on 
the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), which has only provided recommendations 
not final approval.
126
 Clive Schofield argues that the Arctic states are more assertive by 
assuming a sovereign rights-oriented approach to securitize territory even if such claims 
lack accuracy.
127
 This sovereign-rights approach has created friction between Russia and 
Denmark, which are embroiled in disputes over the Lomonosov Ridge and as Kristin 
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Casper contends, ambiguous provisions in UNCLOS only exacerbate tensions among 
claimants.
 128
   
 Another issue over UNCLOS is that the United States has yet to ratify this 
international treaty. Although the United States adheres to most UNCLOS provisions, it 
is not required to abide to the dispute settlement mechanism under Part XV.
129
 
Consequently, failure to sign this international maritime treaty has raised concerns about 
its commitment to the Arctic and general support of international treaties to which all 
Arctic states are signatories. It could create tensions over maritime disputes, especially 
with the OCS. To this end, the Aspen Institute argues “there is an obvious need for 
greater international cooperation and collaboration between states, which includes 
participation from all levels of civil society and interested stakeholders, to support 
effective management of the Arctic ecosystem.”
130
  
An outdated convention to an evolving problem  
The MARPOL convention regulates dumping and pollution by protecting 
offshore areas through “the complete elimination of intentional pollution of the marine 
environment by oil and other harmful substances and the minimization of accidental 
discharge of such substances” from commercial ships.
131
 This includes any vessel 
operating in the marine environment and fixed or floating platforms.
132
 In addition, 
MARPOL allows parties to designate special areas, otherwise known as a “particularly 
sensitive sea area,” where discharges from oil and gas rigs or ships are prohibited as long 
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as it does not exceed 15 parts per million.
133
 However, portions of the Arctic have not 
been designated as a special area under the MARPOL convention and fall outside of its 
regulatory powers.
134
 In a region now witnessing an increase in commercial shipping 
traffic and offshore activities, there are concerns that this convention is outdated and must 
be modified to address the changing environment. In particular, unpredictable weather, 
extreme remoteness, freezing temperatures, the lack of good charts, communication 




ECONOMIC VIABILITY – OPPORTUNITY MASKED IN RISK AND VOLATILITY 
This section examines how prepared the oil and gas industry is to develop the 
Arctic and whether offshore development can deliver long-term benefits to the Arctic 
states and indigenous peoples. Also, the section also examines the viability of new 
development in light of economic risks, such as market volatility, cost overruns and 
project delays, the lack of critical infrastructure, and the emergence of cheaper 
unconventional energy alternatives.  
Investment risk and market volatility   
 Extracting and transporting oil and gas to market is an ongoing challenge for the 
oil and gas industry. Michael Kuzik argues “the biggest obstacle, once oil and or natural 
gas reserves are found, is getting the resources to market in a cost-effective manner.”
 136
 
To date, this remains a significant economic obstacle to development. Charles Emmerson 
estimates the commerciality of any project is based on expectation of future market prices 
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for oil and gas. For the Arctic, the price of oil would have to remain between $80-120 per 
barrel to provide a strong incentive for exploration and confidence that this price 
premium could cushion high production costs.
137
  Because global oil prices are extremely 
volatile, influenced by demand cycles, supply disruption, and speculation, there is a level 
of uncertainty attached to Arctic development. As a result, Alex Williams states the oil 
and gas industry will be vulnerable to price swings that can cause boom-bust cycles and 
impact investment.
138
 Lars Lindholt is more pessimistic about the amount of recoverable 
oil and gas as he predicts the Arctic can only marginally contribute about 8-10 percent to 
global production.
139
 With long lead times and high development costs, optimism over 
Arctic oil and gas could wane if the recoverable rates are lower than anticipated.   
The lack of critical infrastructure   
Another complication is the absence of infrastructure, such as deep-water ports, 
airports, roads, icebreaker and marine vessels, and satellite communications. Alex 
Williams contends that the oil and gas industry cannot ignore the technical challenges 
that stand in way of development. Whether it is 3-D seismic surveying, trenching and 
laying pipe in ice covered waters, or drilling around dangerous ice flows, operations in 
the Arctic can be limited by harsh and unpredictable conditions.
140
 Further, Peter Hough 
argues it would not be sensible for the oil and gas industry to expand in a region where 
costs of exploration, extraction and transport are much higher than the Gulf of Mexico.
141
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Concerns over infrastructure are not new as Øistein Harsem adds that the Arctic’s largest 
fields were discovered thirty years ago, but due to high development costs and the 
unpredictable climate, few have ever reached production.
142
 Other scholars disagree with 
this assessment, pointing to the fact that the oil and gas industry will continue to invest in 
the region because it is one of the last places left to develop.
143
 
Cost overruns and project delays  
 High development costs also cause projects delays. A Bernstein Research report 
forecasts “development costs will be at the high side of the industry range and 
development times are likely to disappoint.”
144
 On the other hand, Jessica Tippee argues 
that such forecasts do not dissuade some oil and gas companies from investing in 
exploration and production, pointing out that capital expenditure will increase by $7 
billion annually through 2017.
145
 However, this does not guarantee that investment 
always has positive results. For example, the Shtokman project is the poster child of cost 
overruns. Because of harsh conditions and tax break issues, the project’s cost shot up 
from $6 billion in 1994 to around $40 billion in 2011.
146
 The reality is that the Arctic 
environment is unforgiving and can be financially burdensome for oil and gas companies 
already vested in project development. To curb operating costs in the Arctic, the 
Norwegian energy company, Statoil developed subsea infrastructure to replace expensive 
platforms and circumvent surface hazards. This technological breakthrough is widely 
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used by the oil and gas industry as it is being utilized in other offshore regions around the 
world.
147
   
The cheaper alternative – the emergence of unconventional oil and gas   
 Called a game-changer, shale oil and gas has revolutionized and reshaped not just 
global energy markets, but has forced the oil and gas industry to reassess where their 
investment dollars are spent. Thanks to new ‘fracing’ technology, onshore shale oil and 
gas has become a new arena for growth and is currently being extracted at feverish rates 
throughout North America. The shale boom has also directly impacted Arctic gas 
development, which is more expensive and takes longer to bring to market. John Deutch, 
states that shale gas “has economics on its side. In the United States today, oil is three 
times as costly as natural gas for a given amount of energy. Such a differential is a 
powerful incentive to develop new technology to substitute natural gas for gasoline used 
in the transportation sector.”
148
 This goes to the heart of the industry’s long-term 
development strategy as an Ernst & Young report suggests “for the industry, it is about 
utilizing new technology to extract hydrocarbon resources and to lower their supply chain 
costs.”
149
 Investment decisions are made over a 20-to-30 year horizon, which means the 
oil and gas industry is faced with a difficult task of forecasting not only how technology 
will drive future energy consumption and supply, but how it will change day-to-day 
operations, drive cost savings and commercialize new energy sources.
150
 Because Arctic 
development requires more technical skill and advanced technological capabilities to 
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undertake operations, Woods Mackenzie warns that the capacity gap in expert and 
technology will likely delay production of a large portion of commercial gas until 
2050.”
151
 Further, it shows how costly and time-consuming such operations in the Arctic 
will continue to be even in the presence of rapid sea-ice melt.  
FOSSIL FUELS, CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE FRAGILITY OF MARINE ECOSYSTEMS  
The effects of global warming and climate change cannot be ignored as the Arctic 
is the epicenter of an intensifying debate behind the anthropogenic impacts on the planet. 
Most notably, the burning of fossil fuels is the main culprit for the rapid increase of CO2 
emissions and global warming. Because new offshore development will generate more 
pollution in a rapidly evolving region, there are lingering questions about this will impact 
the livelihoods of indigenous peoples, the surrounding marine ecosystems, and of course, 
global efforts to curb CO2 emissions. 
The inevitable side-effect to offshore development  
 There are four stages of oil and gas development that impact the environment. 
Perhaps most impactful, is the development and production stage where the most intense 
and diverse environmental impacts occur.
152
 Flaring and leakage, a side-affect to the 
drilling process, also contributes to petroleum components being released into the air and 
water. The construction of oil and gas infrastructure can cause noise pollution that impact 
migratory patterns of species.
153
 In an effort to reassure policymakers, local communities 
and environmentalists that operational safety standards have improved, the industry has 
invested billions of dollars to minimize flaring, leakage, and reduce noise pollution. But 
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as Nicholas Cunningham argues the “industry would claim that drilling operations a 
much safer and that these are isolated incidents; however, they merely demonstrate that 
offshore oil drilling remains an inherently risky activity.”
154
 
Unproven oil spill response strategies  
 Advanced exploration and drilling technologies have made the discovery and 
extraction process more efficient and safer, but the oil and gas industry’s response 
strategies to spills have not changed. In the event of a spill, response and cleanup 
operations involve oil containment, skimming, release of dispersants, and in-situ burning. 
In the Arctic, these response techniques are unproven to work in harsh winter conditions. 
The Aspen Institute warns that “international interests in the Arctic appear to be fixated 
not on how to minimize the pervasive damage there, but how to define territory and 
exercise national dominion over the rich natural resources in terms of oil and gas.”
155
 
Even with assurances from the industry, a recent Pew Institute study found that “oil spill 
contingency plans often underestimate the probability and consequence of catastrophic 
blowouts, particularly for frontier offshore drilling.”
156
 The Center for American Progress 
published recommendations highlighting the need to implement a worse-case scenario 
within contingency plans as a means of avoiding an Exxon Valdez or Deepwater Horizon-
type disaster in the Arctic.
157
 Such warnings are not unfounded especially because the 
Arctic has a short growing season and its ecosystem is less resilient to oil spills than 
warmer environments.  Alexi Roginko states that the absence of a spill response strategy 
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has already had a profound impact on the Russian Arctic where pollution levels now 
exceed national levels by six times.
158
   
 To make matters worse, oil and gas companies already operating in the Arctic 
region have a long history of spills, especially along Alaska’s North Slope. According to 
the National Resource Defense Council (NRDC) “there has been a spill of oil or 
associated chemicals once a day, on average, since oil and gas development began on the 
North Slope.”
159
 Further, the NRDC found that most accidents involve pipelines and the 
laying of these networks from the wells to shore. Perhaps most concerning in their 
analysis was that even after a massive disaster like the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill, the 
number of spills of crude oil and petroleum products actually increased from about 130 in 
1977 to roughly 340 in 2000 in the North Slope alone. Moreover, Alaska’s Department of 
Environmental Conservation (ADEC) released data from July 1995 through January 2011 
that indicated the frequency of oil plus other hydrocarbon and other toxic spills combined 
was nearly double that for oil spills alone.
160
 Collectively, this data illustrates a 
staggering reality of corporate negligence and the lack of oversight by U.S. regulators to 
address the threat of spills and industrial accidents even in the most fragile environments.  
The true impact of climate change  
 The Arctic is the bellwether for climate change as the ever-increasing CO2 
emissions is markedly changing this once frozen environment. In fact, rapid ice-melt and 
positive feedbacks cause temperatures to increase double the rate to anywhere else on the 
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 The changes to the surrounding environment pose a threat to the oil and gas 
industry as extreme weather events and weaker ice could interrupt operations or damage 
drilling infrastructure.
162
 In an effort to address the impacts of climate change, the oil and 
gas industry is investing in new technologies, such as ice tracking radar, reinforced 
drilling rigs and oil tankers, and subsea systems. However, this does not address the 
bigger problem, as climatologists argue, where substantive research is needed to better 
understand the nexus between rapid ice-melt and the impacts on the region and planet. 
Unfortunately, Nicholas Cunningham is more pessimistic about the future of research 
because “the acquisition of scientific knowledge on the Arctic has been relegated to a 
secondary priority when oil and gas development are in question.”
163
   
Climate change is also has a lasting impact on the 4 million indigenous people 
living in the Arctic region. The frequency of extreme weather events is causing extensive 
coastal erosion and has even forced coastal villages to relocate due to the melting 
permafrost, sea-level rise, and the destabilization of infrastructure. The NRDC has 
warned that future offshore development must be reassessed in sensitive areas because of 
the toll already taken on wildlife, landforms, ecosystems, and humans. Because oil and 
gas projects are extensive and have a lasting impact on marine environments, the Arctic’s 
resiliency to withstand large-scale development might very well be further weakened.
164
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CONVERGENCE OF NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS: A PERFECT STORM OR A 
MIRAGE? 
 
 This last section examines the relevance of energy geopolitics to the region. As 
rapid ice-melt occurs, there is a convergence of competing interests between Arctic and 
non-Arctic states over the seabed oil and gas deposits. On one side, there are concerns 
among analysts about how resource competition could lead to conflict. While on the other 
side, other scholars contend that fears over a renewed arms race and a scramble for 
resources are unfounded.    
A media-fuelled frenzy  
 When a robotic submarine planted the Russian flag in the Arctic Circle, many 
considered this to be a landmark event that would usher in new era of energy geopolitics 
in the region. Some experts believed this to be an aggressive move by the Russian 
government, designed to show the world that the Arctic Circle was under its control.
165
 
However, the media storm that ensued after these events failed to create a groundswell of 
reaction from the other Arctic states. Tom Casey, former State Department Deputy 
spokesman retorted, “I’m not sure of whether they’ve put a metal flag, a rubber flag, or a 
bed sheet on the ocean floor. Either way, it doesn’t have any legal standing or effect on 
this claim.”
166
 Michael Klare argued that Russia’s assertiveness provoked more alarmist 
sentiment and did not precipitate an arms race or major deployment of military forces. 
Moreover, conflict is more likely to be shaped by the outcomes of disputes over contested 
international boundaries and territory in the region.
167
 Other experts, like Annika 
Rosamond view the nexus between climate change and political instability as a more 
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critical issue, but with the inundation of media coverage highlighting “geopolitical fault 
lines and anticipated resource wars,” alarmist fears is the real protagonist to potentially 
igniting future conflict.
168
   
A history of cooperation and good diplomatic relations 
Interstate conflict over seabed resources is unlikely to occur because the Arctic 
region is comprised of littoral states with functional governments, well-established 
democratic institutions, and strong diplomatic ties. The Arctic states, including Canada, 
Denmark, Russia, Norway, United States, and Finland are committed to international 
conventions, like UNCLOS, and bilateral negotiations to diffuse tensions. In fact, 
Heather Conley argues that Arctic states have a strong history of good relations that has 
helped resolve long-standing territorial disputes. For example, the Norwegian-Russian 
Delimitation Treaty signed in 2010 was a display of conflict resolution that ended a 40-
year dispute through using diplomatic channels.
169
 In the absence of political calamity, 
some scholars argue more focus should be placed on coordinate, collaboration, and 
interoperability. A Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report indicates 
the real security challenges are not terrorism or piracy rather oil-spill prevention, 
coordinated response to accidents and search-and-rescue capabilities.
170
 This was 
reiterated by a United States Coast Guard (USGS) report that stressed multilayered 
cooperation, ranging from federal, state, tribal, local government to international 
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GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION OVER OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS RESOURCES 
The question over governance and regulation of the Arctic seabed resources has 
become intertwined with energy security. In fact, energy security is an integral element to 
national security that Daniel Yergin argues is “once again among the top priorities in the 
global policy agenda” as states attempt to secure new supply through bilateral and 
multilateral agreements.
172
 The search for new supply makes the Arctic, one of the last 
frontiers to be developed, a golden opportunity for the oil and gas industry. Scott 
Borgerson argues “no matter what one thinks should be done about global warming, the 
fact is, it is happening. And its effects are not all bad. In the Arctic, it is turning an 
impassible region into an emerging epicenter of industry and trade.”
173
 But, climate 
change has precipitated concerns about how oil and gas can be exploited in a sustainable 
manner in the midst of such drastic environmental change.  
In fact, some experts argue that narrowly focusing on the economic benefits in the 
Arctic is near-sighted. The Aspen Institute contends that a sustainable framework for 
governance in the region must include environmental protection and regulations to 
accommodate for the uptick in economic activity. In particular, the adoption of a 
common set of offshore oil and gas standards and spill response strategies would be a 
positive step forward.
174
 To achieve this, Arctic states, indigenous peoples, and the oil 
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and gas industry must address current governance and regulation structures and tackle 
any deficiencies within these standards. 
Nonetheless, there is debate as to how prepared the oil and gas industry is to 
undertake offshore operations. Securing America’s Future Energy (SAFE) expressed 
confidence in the oil and gas industry, arguing that the Deepwater Horizon disaster 
largely overshadowed two decades of remarkable progress in reducing oil spills. 
175
 
However, in remote areas, like the Arctic, where infrastructure and contingency response 
plans are lacking, an oil spill could be disastrous. Such fears were realized after Royal 
Dutch Shell’s (Shell) attempt to drill off the coast of Alaska ended after two of their 
drilling ships were damaged due to fierce storms.
176
 After a Department of Interior 
investigation in 2013, then Secretary Ken Salazar testified that “Shell screwed up in 2012 
and we are not going to let them screw up when they try to drill in the Arctic again.” 
Salazar also raised concerns about Shell’s maritime and response operations, stating that 
there are “serious questions regarding its ability to operate safely and responsibly in the 
challenging and unpredictable conditions.”
177
 Further, the US Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals found both Shell and federal regulators culpable of gross negligence in the 
preparation of environmental impact statements and review of safety standards. This has 
led to further delay in drilling operations for 2014 that has angered senior U.S. legislators 
who argued that “we can expect Shell to continue to spell billions of dollars on this 
                                                          
175
 Energy Security Leadership Council, “A National Strategy for Energy Security: Harnessing American 
Resources and Innovation,” Securing America’s Future Energy (2013), 66-67.  
176
 John M. Broder, “With two Ships Damaged, Shell Suspends Arctic Drilling, The New York Times, 
February 27, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/28/business/energy-environment/shell-suspends-
arctic-drilling-for-2013.html  
177






project when the rules keep changing.”
178
 Senator Lisa Murkowski pointed out that the 
failure of the Obama administration to provide regulatory and permitting certainty for oil 
development is the reason behind delays.
179
 Shell’s chief executive, Ben van Beurden 
voiced disappointment in the decision and stressed that further delays will impact the 
Alaskan economy where Shell employed 2,000 people, including Alaska’s indigenous 
peoples for its exploration program.
180
 Conversely, environmental groups praised the 
decision to delay exploration and drilling operations in the Arctic, citing it was a 
responsible decision to provide more time to reconsider whether offshore operations can 
move ahead in a safe and responsible manner.
181
  
 These events epitomize the bigger issue over governance and regulation in the 
region. It also raises the alarm of how, even at the national level, there are disagreements 
over what type of governance and regulation structure is acceptable in the Arctic region. 
Prolonged disagreement perpetuates the absence of standardization and allows negligence 
among regulators and industry to permeate. This unfortunate reality was seen in the 
Deepwater Horizon disaster where the National Commission on the BP Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling concluded that the Macondo blowout could have 
been prevented had there been sufficient oversight, adequate agency funding, and a 
commitment to corporate responsibility.
182
 If lingering concerns surround the 
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management of offshore operations in the Gulf of Mexico then the Arctic presents an 
even greater challenge to large-scale development. Beyond the vast difference in climate, 
the web of parties involved, ranging from Arctic and non-Arctic states to indigenous 
peoples and industry, the debate of how to govern and regulate the region’s offshore 
activities is complex. This requires a further examination as to what governance option 
might be most attractive to addressing these concerns and improving operational capacity 
in the Arctic region. Jorge R. Pińon, former president of Amoco Latin America argued 
that “you can go ahead and draft all the regulations that you wish, but if those regulations 
are not enforced, they are totally worthless. We need rule of law, governance and 
transparency.”
183
 Fortunately, the Arctic is comprised of states that are able and capable 
of enforcing such regulations, but the question that remains is how to improve existing 
governance and regulation mechanisms where certain risks can be curtailed.  
THE ANTARCTIC TREATY – A HARD LAW APPROACH TO GOVERNANCE AND 
REGULATION 
 
 To begin, this paper analyzes whether a legally binding international treaty could 
serve as a blueprint for a more sustainable approach to offshore development. Whether 
this involves reducing pollution and impact on marine environment, protecting species, 
satisfying the interests of the indigenous peoples or addressing climate change, advocates 
argue that ATS provides a successful example of maritime governance and regulation. By 
adopting a hard law approach for the Arctic would mean offshore oil and gas activities, 
which do not fall under a common set of regulations and compliance, could finally be 
effectively enforced under the guise of a new international convention.     
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The rationale behind a legally-binding convention 
 The ATS is a legally-binding international treaty that has been considered a 
blueprint for future governance and regulation of the Arctic. Some scholars argue that a 
legally-binding treaty carries four distinct benefits. First, the establishment of an 
overarching legally-binding regime can promote cooperation among member states and 
influence the creation of regional regimes to expand its mandate. Second, a binding 
agreement produces better compliance than commitments not supported by the force of 
law.
184
 Although ATS faced obstacles in the negotiation and ratification stages, 
incremental negotiation allowed the ATS to evolve into a comprehensive treaty. After 
ratification, national policymakers codified the rules and regulations into legislation 
where it became law and held national governments accountable to the ATS treaty. This 
process was tenuous and time-consuming, but the result was near unanimous 
international support and compliance. In contrast, there is not a common set of 
regulations for Arctic offshore oil and gas activities, which allows states to decide what 
practices are acceptable.
185
 However, Oran Young contends that the goal of “devising a 
comprehensive governance system for the Arctic” is unattainable.
186
 This is a common 
critique of treaties where cost, time and difficulty to resolve issues influence the success 
of a hard-law instrument. But, even landmark international treaties, like UNCLOS, took 
decades to implement for rationale reasons. To achieve international support requires a 
lengthy negotiation process where culture, language, history and interpretation often 
collide to influence ratification. If ratification occurs, it is due to cooperation and political 
                                                          
184
Oran Young, “The Structure of Arctic Cooperation: Solving Problems Seizing Opportunities,” Institute 
of Arctic Studies, 9 (2004): 3-22.  
185
 Travis Potts, “An Arctic Scramble? Opportunities and Threats in the (Formerly) Frozen North,” 
International Journal Marine and Coastal Law, 23 (2008): 151-52.   
186




willingness to work past differences of opinion and collectively act on a particular policy 
issue. Third, a hard-law approach prevents a race to the bottom as “an agreed set of 
legally binding international standards…could prevent or at least slow, a race to the 
bottom, in which states compete in the gaining of concessions, exchanging regulatory 
slackness for greater royalties or up-front licensing fees, or in times of higher oil 
prices…”
187
 Finally, hard-law advocates argue that the benefits of a binding instrument 
outweigh the costs to avoid future harm or conflict.
188
   
Greater inclusivity and participation on complex issues  
Upon ratification of the ATS in 1959, this convention gained near full support 
from the international community.
189
 For an uninhabited frozen continent, this was 
considered a landmark treaty especially due to the extremely volatile political climate. 
Perhaps more impressive, the ATS was ratified even in the presence of unresolved 
territorial disputes in Antarctica. Although most of these territorial disputes remain 
unresolved, claimants to ATS agreed to shelve the disputes for the sake of ratification. In 
an effort to further limit activities in Antarctica that might create conflict, resource 
extraction and military activities were banned as a means of promoting a peaceful 
resolution to ongoing disputes.  
Most important, the ATS epitomized participation and inclusiveness of all parties. 
During negotiations, parties to the treaty were part of an open-dialogue approach where 
ample time and flexibility was provided to resolve differing interests and opinions over 
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its provisions. Of course, this did not guarantee ratification of each provision in the treaty. 
For instance, the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resources Activities 
was signed by 19 states, but was not ratified. In 1988, this convention was replaced by 
the Madrid Protocol and further illustrates that from the agenda-setting to implementation 
stages, ratification often requires renegotiation or alternative solutions in order to satisfy 
its members. Perhaps the biggest misconception about the hard-law approach is that these 
treaties are inflexible and do not allow for open-dialogue. In this case, Oran Young 
argues it would not be an effective mechanism for governance and regulation in the 
Arctic because it is described as a “somewhat messy patchwork made up of disparate 
pieces.” Young also adds that an international treaty is also not practical where existing 
regional regimes already serve as forums for dialogue.
190
 However, Young discounts the 
effectiveness of participation and inclusivity at the international level. Although 
imperfect, the ATS was a comprehensive treaty because it allowed parties the flexibility 
to devise provisions that would protect the marine environment, promote joint scientific 
research and enforce a ban on economic and military activities.  
Emphasis on environmental protection and the conservation of resources   
 ATS includes provisions on marine protection and natural resource conservation 
that might be exportable to the Arctic. The underlying principles of the ATS were 
centered upon the “…governance of Antarctic, protection of the environment, 
conservation of natural resources and scientific research.”
191
 In fact, the major 
components of the ATS are the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, the 1972 Antarctic Seals 
Convention, the 1980 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 
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Resources (CCAMLR), the 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection of the Antarctic 
Treaty (Protocol), and proposed 1988 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral 
Resources Activities (CRAMRA). Together, these provisions provide a comprehensive 
governance system that focuses on the protection of the marine ecosystem and the 
regulation of natural resource extraction.
192
 For the last five decades, the parties to the 
ATS have adhered to its mandate and as a result, the Antarctic has not been seen any 
economic activity other than tourism and scientific research teams.  
A driving factor for such a strong mandate on environmental protection was a 
growing concern among parties to the ATS about the impact of development on the 
surrounding marine ecosystem. In an effort to minimize its footprint on the continent, the 
ATS included provisions to protect the environment and conserve its rich resource base. 
For instance, environmental assessments reports were used to measure impacts of future 
economic activities and if needed, special protection areas could be designated off limits 
to future development. In particular, the ratification of the 1991 Protocol solidified the 
treaty’s commitment to environmental protection and scientific research. Specifically, the 
Protocol’s objectives were “to reaffirm the status of the Antarctica as a special 
conservation area, and to enhance the framework for the protection of the Antarctic 
environment with its dependent and associated ecosystem.”
193
 In other words, the aim is 
to protect the Antarctic environment and associated ecosystems and preserves the 
intrinsic value of the continent as well as its status as a place of research. Within the 
Protocol, the Committee for Environmental Protection (CEP) was also established as an 
expert advisory body to provide advice and formulate recommendations to the Antarctic 
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Significant gaps in addressing offshore development and climate change  
  Unlike the Arctic, the Antarctic is part of the global commons and not subject to 
the exclusive jurisdictions of any state.
195
 This is a glaring difference that limits the 
success of a new international treaty as Arctic littoral states have sovereign and 
jurisdictional rights in the region.  Given most offshore oil and gas is located within their 
EEZs, it further limits the reach of international conventions to regulate offshore 
development and protect marine ecosystems. As a result, rapid development in some 
areas, like Russia and Alaska, has outpaced regulation. In a climate of rapid offshore 
growth where governance and regulation is lacking, the potential for a spill can happen as 
witnessed in the Deepwater Horizon accident in 2010. This example carries weight as 
Arctic development continues to increase in light of the divisiveness at the national-level 
between regulators, environmentalists, the industry and policymakers. Part of the 
problem lies in the fact that there is no governance or regulatory body dedicated to 
offshore hydrocarbon activities. Instead, current international governance and regulations 
are utilized even though they are seen as piecemeal and inconsistent. Another part of the 
problem stems from the fact that the ATS does not contain any guidelines on offshore 
development because no such activities are allowed. Although this represents a 
significant gap in governance and regulation, it is important to note that there is not a 
“one-size fits all” solution to offshore development.   
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Other scholars argue that reaching consensus on complex energy issues is difficult 
due to competing interests where parties “tend to get stuck in the agenda and negotiation 
stages, and never reach implementation.”
196
 Whether this is the result of geopolitical 
issues or cooperative governance, energy production is a narrative of tension between 
consumers and producers.
197
 This tit-for-tat strategy puts pressure on the Arctic states to 
maintain a state-centric approach where national energy policies trump global energy 
governance.
198
 That said, with the addition of more parties also comes more interests and 
interpretations that complicate consensus-building. When pursuing offshore development, 
Arctic states seek a regional solution rather than utilize international channels. In fact, 
Charles Ebinger argues a new treaty will likely inhibit economic opportunity. To shift 
“authority from an existing organization to a new one will disrupt policies and programs 
that are progressing along different tracks and at varying speeds…”
199
 But, there is a call 
to address gaps in governance and regulation by adopting ATS principles or 
strengthening existing ones. These improvements might attract investment and also 
satisfy environmentalists who advocate for reforms to existing governance and regulation 
frameworks in the Arctic region.  
Another significant issue is how climate change impacts offshore development. 
As the surrounding environment changes, there is an incentive for the oil and gas industry 
to expand into this previously inaccessible region. There is no question that resource 
accessibility benefits Arctic states and indigenous peoples since most oil and gas reserves 
                                                          
196
 Sovacool et al., 236-37. 
197
 Kirsten Westphal, “Energy Policy between Multilateral Governance and Geopolitics: Whither Europe?” 
International e Politik and Gsellschaft, (2006) 44-63. 
198
 Ernst & Young, 14.  
199
 Charles K. Ebinger et al., “The Geopolitics of Arctic Melt,” The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 




are located within sovereign waters, but it is also fair to assume that the scale of 
development will extend beyond the range of the current governance and regulation 
structures. Consequently, Sebastien Duyck contends that the increased activity without 
proper regulation and governance will lead to environmental and social consequences. 
Coupled with climate change, the Arctic states are challenged to balance the protection of 
marine ecosystems with economic development. On the other hand, the ATS is not faced 
with the same concerns. Although climate change is having an impact on the continent, 
the absence of economic activity has allowed the treaty to focus on a proactive and 
precautionary approach that favors environmental protection. That said, a legally binding 
treaty should not be pursued without taking into account fairness and equity. In the Arctic, 
an international regime for governance and regulation must address a balance of rights, 
interests, and obligations of the Arctic states and indigenous peoples.
200
 In this case, the 
discussion over balance of development and environmental protection falls into the hands 
of these parties who have jurisdiction over parts of the region slated for future 
development.  
The debate between regionalization and internationalization  
The fate of a new international treaty might have already been sealed with the 
Ilulissat Declaration. In 2008, the United States, Canada, Denmark, Norway, and Russia 
agreed to use UNCLOS as the main instrument for resolving territorial disputes. Thomas 
Winkler states “the main point is that the five coastal states have sent a very clear 
political signal to everybody that we will manage the Arctic responsibly, that we have the 
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international rules necessary and we will all abide by those rules.”
201
 On the other hand, 
the European Union (EU) has been critical of the Ilulissat Declaration because it excludes 
some outlying Arctic states, indigenous peoples and the international community. The 
EU and non-Arctic states want to internationalize the Arctic, noting climate change, 
shipping lanes, and transnational pollution impact the international community. Guo 
Peqing points out that “Circumpolar states have to understand that Arctic affairs are not 
only regional issues but also international ones.”
202
   
THE ARCTIC COUNCIL: A SOFT LAW APPROACH TO GOVERNANCE AND 
REGULATION 
 
The second option looks at a soft law approach focused on the intergovernmental 
forum, known as the AC. In a rapidly changing environment, some experts argue that the 
AC is better suited to address environmental protection and offshore oil and gas 
governance and regulation. Others contend that the limited scope of the AC’s operational 
capacity make it an ineffective option to resolving emerging risks in the region.  
A suitable framework for a rapidly evolving environment  
 There are some advantages to the soft-law approach in the Arctic, especially when 
discussing flexibility and noncompliance. In retrospect, a legally binding treaty can be 
costly and time intensive throughout the negotiation and ratification stages as well as 
with the incorporation of the international treaty into national legislation. Because a soft-
law instrument is not binding in nature, parties remain actively engaged on issues without 
committing to the principles and allow parties to be more apt to settle differences of 
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opinion without the pressure of ratification.
203
 Nonetheless, open-dialogue is cost-
effective strategy that embodies flexibility in addressing and resolving such sensitive 
issues. In this case, the AC is representative of these characteristics as it builds on such 
consensual knowledge to develop strategic plans for action for member states and 
indigenous peoples on issues, like marine protection and offshore oil and gas regulation. 
That said, AC members often share similar interests, but speak different languages on 
how to tackle complex issues. With its non-binding structure, the AC allows time, 
flexibility, and a cost-effective solution to reaching a common understanding on these 
complex issues. 
The Arctic’s changing environment and economic activity are major factors 
driving the AC to improve its adaptive capacity.
204
 For instance, the AC has four 
environmental protection working groups that focus on addressing climate change, 
marine spatial planning (MSP), species protection, and other emerging issues in the 
region. In addition, AC released its Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) from 
2000-2004 to help develop future scenarios for climate change. Although this assessment 
was not a legally binding principle, ACIA created a forum for political discussions and 
highlighted the importance of climate change on the region.
205
 To date, the AC funded 
several assessments that created positive engagement and even influenced member states 
to examine these issues at the national level. The two critical working groups – Protection 
of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) and Emergency, Prevention, Preparedness 
and Response (EPPR) – developed guidelines on spill response strategies, search-and-
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rescue operations, transfer of refined oil and oil products, and marine protection. These 
guidelines have even been incorporated into legislation at the national level among 
several Arctic states.  
A history of regional cooperation and inclusiveness  
Arctic states and indigenous peoples have a history of cooperation and 
collaboration. This also complements the AC, which was designed as a forum to promote 
peaceful dialogue among participants. From its creation in 1996, the AC’s membership 
has expanded to include eight circumpolar states, six Arctic indigenous organizations, 
and non-Arctic states.
206
 That said, the AC is not an organization capable of 
implementing legally binding provisions for its members rather it is serves a decision-
shaping entity.
207
 Some scholars contend the AC’s lack of authority and enforcement 
powers challenge its level of effectiveness. This a valid concern because without the 
authority to make binding decisions, the AC is as effective as its members want it to 
be.
208
 Nonetheless, AC strives for inclusivity and caters to a regionalized approach to 
address issues in contrast to matters of primary concern to individual states or non-state 
actors operating within the region. It also serves as an important consensus-based and 
project-driven forum that has built upon a history of regional cooperation and 
collaboration among its member states and organizations. 
Ambitious agenda to regulate offshore activities and enhance environmental protection  
   
The AC has already implemented a set of guidelines to address offshore oil and 
gas activities. In fact, the ‘Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines’ outlined oil and gas 
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planning, exploration, development, production and decommissioning concerns.
209
 The 
AC also set forth provisions to develop consistent communication and translation 
guidelines of how oil and gas activities should be undertaken. A key aspect to these 
guidelines was the incorporation of environmental impact assessments for future offshore 
projects. Beyond placing an importance on the environmental impacts associated with 
offshore development, the AC stressed the importance of implementing polluter-pays and 
sustainable development principles that hold the oil and gas industry accountable for any 
accidents or spills.
210
 Because no global standards or recommended practices for offshore 
activities exist, the AC should be given credit as it has raised awareness and addressed 
certain gaps by establishing a set of offshore oil and gas guidelines. Even without legal 
authority to make such guidelines binding in nature, the AC implemented strategic plans, 
and important assessment work that influences national governments, policymakers and 
other non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
211
   
In the absence of global and regional rules to address climate change and 
environment protection, concerns over the Arctic’s ecosystem resilience, adaption 
readiness, and sustainable development must be addressed in an expedited manner.
212
 To 
begin, the AC addressed concerns over oil spill response strategies, search and rescue 
operations, and sustainable development options for future meetings. However, there has 
not been any consistency on the implementation of an integrated, cross-sectoral 
ecosystem-based ocean management framework. Adopting this integrated approach to 
development and environmental protection is a necessary strategy given the heightened 
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environment sensitivities throughout the region. Similar to its other successful 
assessments and guideline frameworks, the AC can be the impetus to promote such a 
framework. In fact, the AC continues to work to improve sustainable development goals 
and implement better practices in environmental protection and marine management.
213
 
The AC also developed ‘Best Practices in Ecosystems Based Oceans Management 
(BePoMAR), a project focused on different states’ approaches to management strategies, 
and created the ‘Circumpolar Map of Resources at Risk from Oil Spills in the Arctic.’
214
 
Thus, the AC has become the most important organization to address an integrated, cross-
sectoral ecosystems-based ocean management option.  
A regional solution can be effective   
 The AC works with its member states’ interests and serves as an important forum 
for the entire Arctic to express their views and concerns. It is not surprising that its 
members, for a variety of reasons, oppose a new system and support a broadening 
approach to the AC’s mandate. In particular, there are limitations to the expansion of 
powers as member states and indigenous peoples are not be willing to cede sovereign 
interests for a new international convention.
215
 Instead, the AC has shown its ability to 
compartmentalize the issue of opening up the region by effectively responding to the 
evolving environment and the implications to such change.   
 A regional response might also precipitate the increase of multilateral and 
bilateral agreements between AC member states. Because member states have voiced 
their confidence in the AC as a capable forum to resolve issues, international interference 
is not viewed as a viable option. Although there are a lot of obstacles to future offshore 
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development, the AC has its ear to the ground and is the intermediary to which member 
states and outside parties utilize to discuss what the best practices should be in the region. 
Also, in a region that is political stable, the AC has the full support of all Arctic states and 
various indigenous organizations moving forward.  
Limitations in capacity can impede future governance and regulation 
 At the same time, there are significant gaps with the AC’s scope of influence and 
overall capacity to govern and regulate offshore activities. The five most distinct gaps 
with the AC is that it cannot impose legally binding obligations, does not resemble an 
operational body, has limited participation, lacks funding, and does not have a full-time 
permanent secretariat. In a recent study that quantified overall effectiveness of the AC, 
Oran Young and Paula Kankaanpää found that the prevailing factors to limit its capacity 
were centered on the lack of reliable funding, the inability to implement 
recommendations into policy, and member states not placing a high priority on Arctic 
issues.
216
 That said, AC has been tasked to address significant transformative changes 
that range from growing demand for new natural resources to the decline of sea ice. 
Young argues that the AC has been put in a challenging position, but for the most part 
has performed quite well given its limitations. Where it could receive a face-lift is 
through improved assessment on the performance of the AC as a means of making a 
series of adjustments in the structure and procedures to maximize effectiveness.
217
 Others 
contend that the AC needs to expand its scope of influence by engaging the interests of 
regional and local constituencies along with major non-Arctic states.  
                                                          
216
 Paula Kankaanpää and Oran R. Young, “The Effectiveness of the Arctic Council,” Norwegian Polar 
Institute (2012): 5. 
217




 To address capacity deficiencies, AC focused on improving cooperation with its 
members in areas of environmental protection and sustainable development. Although it 
traditionally does not have the capacity to create legally-binding regulations, the AC 
pushed its members to sign the Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement in 2011, its first 
binding treaty under AC support.
218
 Even non-Arctic states, like China have expressed 
interest in participating in the activities of the AC so much so that they have presented a 
formal petition to become an official observer. To this end, the AC’s limitations are 
evident, but its success to act as a forum for future economic development, environmental 
protection and cooperation should not be underestimated.  
CONCLUSION 
 Without question, the Arctic is undergoing transformative change. In particular, 
climate change and global warming are opening up access to seabed resources that had 
been frozen in time. Coupled with the demand for new supply, the Arctic is the last 
frontier left to be developed. Although there are limited offshore oil and gas activities in 
the region, large-scale development has been inhibited by unpredictable environmental 
and economic conditions. Despite these risks, the Arctic’s reserves, often compared to the 
Gulf of Mexico, make it hard for the oil and gas industry to simply ignore.  
To address these risks, many advocates have called for a new international 
convention to regulate and enforce new offshore activities in the Arctic. But this will be 
challenging in an environment comprised of littoral states and indigenous peoples who 
share economic, environmental and strategic interests. Even so, these advocates for 
internationalization argue that the mere presence of complex and sensitive issues require 
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the international community, not regional entities, like the AC, to act swiftly and 
effectively. In fact, climate change, transnational pollution, new international shipping 
lanes, and the protection of marine ecosystems are viewed by the EU and other non-
Arctic states as international issues that require collective action. With the addition of oil 
and gas activities, international intervention will be tested as littoral states and indigenous 
peoples attempt to protect their sovereign rights over seabed resources.  
Looking beyond the debate over the adoption of a new convention to govern and 
regulate offshore activities, the risks associated with such large scale development are not 
unfounded. The offshore is the next arena development and the oil and gas industry 
reassure policymakers, environmentalists, the public, and indigenous peoples they are 
prepared to extract oil and gas in remote and harsh climates, like the Arctic. But, there is 
a growing concern that existing governance and regulation structures do not effectively 
address environmental and economic unpredictability. Coupled with the fact that the oil 
and gas industry have failed to address the absence of critical infrastructure and neglected 
to improve oil spill response strategies, there are red flags about the sustainability of 
future development. After the Deepwater Horizon disaster and Shell’s recent failed 
drilling operations in Alaska, the oil and gas industry and government regulators have 
come under scrutiny about the ability to safely develop and manage offshore projects. On 
one side, the oil and gas industry has a responsibility to adopt comprehensive plans to 
improve oil spill response, reduce marine pollution, address infrastructure inefficiencies, 
and improve safety standards. While on the other, governments have an obligation to 




Unfortunately, gaps in governance and regulation pose a significant threat to the 
surrounding marine environment and the livelihoods of millions throughout the region.    
Because the Arctic’s ecosystems are undergoing such unprecedented changes and 
are not as resilient to change as other environments around the planet, offshore oil and 
gas development must adhere to stricter governance and regulations. With the absence of 
critical infrastructure, inefficient oil spill response strategies and limited knowledge about 
the impacts of climate change and offshore development on the marine environment, 
there is an urgency to improve governance and regulation. Further, sustainability is at the 
heart of the debate because economic development and environmental protection are 
inextricably linked. To promote sustainable development, there needs to be a thoughtful 
approach in planning and regulation that considers the needs of future generations and 
examines the critical importance of ecosystem stability and vulnerability that directly 
impact humanity. Thus, the exploitation of oil and gas, fisheries, forests, mineral 
resources and increased shipping and tourism should not compromise the integrity and 
function of natural systems, which might be irreplaceable and are of critical importance 
to the health of the planet.  
To tackle these concerns, there are two options that can be considered to address 
current gaps in governance and regulation. These two options – the adoption of a legally 
binding or non-legally binding instrument – has led to a debate between Arctic and non-
Arctic states, indigenous peoples, and NGOs. After further examination, the adoption of a 
new convention for the Arctic region, similar to the ATS, will be difficult to accomplish. 
Rather, the support of an already existing regime is the preferred option. A soft-law 




problems without committing to legally binding obligations. To date, the AC has proven 
to be an effective mechanism to address climate change, offshore oil and gas activities 
and environmental protection. Although the AC is a policy shaping forum that depends 
on Arctic states and their respective national governments to implement policy, it has 
shown its resilience and adaptability to an evolving region. Not only is this is an 
important assessment of the AC’s effectiveness, but also provides insight of how the 
Arctic states and indigenous peoples will approach future governance and regulation 
concerns.   
The bigger question is whether a non-legally binding institution can motivate 
member states to enact legislation to address the impacts of climate change and economic 
development on the marine environment. Because of the national sensitivities involved in 
the marine domain, littoral states control how offshore development ought to be governed 
and regulated. If this is any indication of what is to come, Arctic states will not adopt 
more assertive attitudes to offshore development, but have confidence in existing 
international regimes to resolve maritime disputes and provide a baseline for 
environmental protection and offshore regulation. Further, the AC has provided the 
forum where gaps in governance and regulation can be discussed and debated among 
member states and observers and can bring contentious issues to the negotiating table. 
Dependence on a regionally-based solution that does not have legally-binding powers 
does make non-Arctic states and other parties question the effectiveness of this approach. 
However, when considering the stark differences between the regions, it makes sense to 
hold littoral states accountable to improve offshore oil and gas governance and 




are unprecedented and to ensure future economic activities operate in a sustainable 
manner, there will be pressure to reform current governance and regulation standards. In 
other words, not only is it in their national security interests to open the Arctic up to 
future economic development, but it is also in their interests to safeguard and enforce a 
new standard of regulations that promotes a sustainable and integrated approach to 
economic development and environmental protection.  
When discussing climate change, environmental protection, and economic 
development, a soft-law approach provides flexibility to negotiate a strategy of action. 
Moreover, the Arctic states and indigenous peoples have placed stock in addressing such 
issues when discussing the future of the Arctic. For the time being, the AC represents the 
best path forward given it is an open-forum of participation and inclusiveness where all 
parties can voice their opinion. It also is an outlet for non-members to provide opinions 
on complex issues, like offshore oil and gas governance and regulation. This also means 
the oil and gas industry, which shares a burden of responsibility for future development, 
should engage in developing and crafting a new set of guidelines that can be a blueprint 
for sustainable offshore development. In the end, this provides a real opportunity to 



























OIL PIRACY AND THEFT IN THE GULF OF GUINEA
 































The Gulf of Aden and Gulf of Guinea represent the world’s hotspots of maritime 
piracy and hijackings. In 2008, Somali pirates grabbed worldwide attention with the 
hijacking of the Sirius Star, a Saudi super tanker carrying two million barrels of oil and 
the dramatic hijacking of the Maersk Alabama, which ended after US Navy SEALs, 
recaptured the vessel and rescued its crew.
219
 Such headline attacks alone do not capture 
how dangerous the Gulf of Aden has become for seaborne commerce. In total, Somali 
pirates have attacked more than 625 vessels, hijacked over 175 private and commercial 
and held over 3,000 people from more than forty countries hostage.
220
 In contrast, the 
Gulf of Guinea is the second most dangerous maritime region in the world. The 
International Maritime Bureau’s (IMB) Piracy Reporting Centre recorded 58 attacks, 
including 10 hijackings, primarily concentrated off Nigeria’s coast.
221
 Although piracy is 
not new, the Gulf of Guinea is endowed with large oil reserves. With 70 percent of 
Africa’s total oil production concentrated in this region, maritime piracy threatens to 
disrupt production and impact global oil prices and all major economies.
222
 
 The threat to global energy security from maritime piracy has reached a boiling 
point in these volatile regions as international waterways of trade and commerce are in 
jeopardy. The Gulf of Aden has 20,000 ships pass through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait each 
year transporting 12 percent of the world’s petroleum to European markets.
223
 About half 
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of the world’s container traffic also passes through the strait. The Gulf of Guinea is also a 
region of international importance for seaborne trade and oil production. With an 
estimated 58 billion barrels of oil, the accessibility and availability of high-quality sweet-
crude make it a valuable energy market.
224
 Because of its strategic importance, 
international oil companies (IOCs) and national oil companies (NOCs) seek to securitize 
offshore acreage, obtain production contracts and infuse billions of investment dollars 
into offshore production. In fact, offshore drilling will account for 25 percent of offshore 
production by 2015 and will likely surpass total production from the Persian Gulf by 
2025.
225
 However, infrastructure and oil-laden tankers are under threat to marauding 
pirates and armed robbers. As maritime piracy off the Nigerian coast increases, fears that 
piracy could spread to surrounding states is being realized. Worse, these brazen attacks 
have a negative impact on global oil prices, production output, and insurance premiums.  
 In response, counter-piracy initiatives have been adopted by the international 
community and have been successful in the Gulf of Aden. However, similar counter-
piracy operations have had a limited success in the Gulf of Guinea. This is in part due to 
the fact that the international community does not have jurisdiction to implement the 
same counter-piracy strategy. In particular, the Gulf of Guinea is comprised of littoral 
states that have control of their territorial waters and more or less have functional 
governments. Thus, combatting maritime piracy is seen as a national responsibility. In an 
effort to find context-specific solutions for combating piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, this 
chapter undertakes a comparative study of the two regions. It asks if self-protection 
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measures and the mobilization of international naval forces were ‘good enough’ short-
term solutions in the Gulf of Aden and if a similar strategy could be applied to the Gulf of 
Guinea given its regional political considerations. Furthermore, what lessons can be 
learned from these and other counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden?   
The methodology for the thesis is centered upon a comparative analysis of 
maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Gulf of Guinea and is comprised of three 
sections. In the first section, the paper examines maritime piracy by highlighting the 
distinct differences in geography, motivation, tactics, and organizational structure. 
Further, this section examines counter-piracy initiatives undertaken by the private sector 
(shipping, oil and gas industry and private contractors) and regional and international 
powers. In the second section, this paper analyzes gaps in current counter-piracy 
initiatives that present challenges to effectively combatting piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. 
Finally, the thesis provides policy recommendations that are designed to bridge these 
gaps in counter-piracy initiatives while also tackling long-term strategies for the Gulf of 
Guinea.     
MARITIME PIRACY IN THE GULF OF ADEN AND THE GULF OF GUINEA 
 
 While it is tempting to argue that maritime piracy exists in regions void of rule of 
law, governance and onshore and offshore security, it is important not to assume that 
such illicit operations only occur under these circumstances. In an effort to better 
comprehend maritime piracy, this section explores both regions and further examines 
how geography, motivation, tactical capacity and organizational structure do vary 
between the Gulf of Aden and the Gulf of Guinea. It also provides an in-depth analysis of 




Geography – the scope of this maritime threat   
 Most offshore attacks originate from the Somalian coastline in close proximity to 
critical international waterways. With major shipping traffic passing through congested 
choke points, commercial freight traffic became enticing targets for unemployed and 
disillusioned Somali men.
226
 As a result, the IMB reported from 2008-2009 half of the 
world’s hijackings took place off the coast of Somalia, covering the area off the country’s 
east coast in the Indian Ocean to the Gulf of Aden.
227
 Even after the mobilization of 
international naval forces in 2008, Somali pirates extended their attack zones to target 
ships farther into the Red Sea and Indian Ocean.
228
  
The base of operations is also quite concentrated even though Somalia has over 
3,300 km of coastline, the longest stretch of any African state. Without a navy or coast 
guard, Somalia’s vast coastline is unpoliced and allowed some coastal regions, like 
Puntland and central Somalia to emerge as safe havens for pirates.
229
 Most safe havens 
are in close proximity to shipping lanes and provide a critical home base for recruitment 
and offer a staging ground for attacks. Maritime piracy is lucrative business not just for 
the pirates, but also these coastal communities. With the average ransom price for the 
release of a ship and crew on average of US $500,000 to US $2 million, piracy brings 
economic prosperity to these coastal communities.
230
 
The Gulf of Guinea is also a crucial transit area for international trade; however, 
there are distinct differences in the location of maritime piracy. First, the Gulf of Guinea 
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is comprised of eleven coastal states with functional central governments with over 300 
million inhabitants. In total, the coastline extends nearly 6,000km, which is roughly the 
size of the Gulf of Mexico and double that of the Somali coast.
231
 This maritime domain 
is governed by littoral states that have an obligation to protect their territorial waters. 
Next, the Gulf of Guinea is an abundant oil region typified by its large oil producers 
(Nigeria and Angola), mature producers (Cameroon and Gabon and new producers 
(Equatorial Guinea and Chad). The oil and gas is highly coveted by Europe and the 
United States because of its quality and proximity to markets and refineries.
232
 But, the 
resource wealth has been more of a curse as the “paradox of plenty” has led to long-
standing conflicts between central governments and ethnic minorities over resource rights 
and distribution of oil revenues. In the Niger Delta (Delta), frustrated ethnic minorities 
and armed groups are responsible for attacks on onshore oil infrastructure and kidnapping 
of multinational personnel. After decades of onshore insecurity, oil theft has now bled 
into the maritime domain and raises concerns about the security of future offshore 
development projects in oil-rich areas, like Nigeria, Angola, Benin, and Togo.
233
 
The base of operations for maritime piracy is concentrated off Nigerian waters 
and within close proximity to the oil-rich Delta region.
234
 Thieves and armed groups 
target commercial traffic and after violence escalated in the Delta insurgency between 
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2006 and 2009, maritime piracy spread to Benin and Togo.
235
 Similar to the Gulf of Aden, 
this region experiences heavy offshore traffic of tankers transporting oil, liquefied natural 
gas (LNG) and refined petroleum products from onshore and offshore installations. With 
commercial traffic and easy accessibility to petroleum, the IMB reported that Nigeria is a 
‘hot spot’ due to its prized oil industry and well-established black market.
236
 In fact, the 
well-establish transnational criminal networks provide a suitable environment for 
maritime piracy as numerous actors seek to gain some financial gain by supporting these 
illicit activities.   
Although, maritime piracy is widely reported to revolve around Nigerian waters, 
there is an expansion of illicit operations into neighboring littoral states. However, there 
is insufficient data as to where the new piracy hotspots are and to what extent the 
maritime threat has infected the region. According to the IMB, the main reason for a lack 
of reporting is that one-third of attempted attacks are never reported because most attacks 
occur within territorial waters. Further, the legal definition of piracy is also inconsistent. 
One on hand, the United States Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) defines 
such attacks within jurisdiction waters not as acts of piracy but armed robbery; however, 
the International  Maritime Organization (IMO), the agency within the UN responsible 
for all aspects of maritime safety and security, provides several definitions of armed 
robbery and piracy.
237
 Nevertheless, the scope of attacks and the base of operations are 
expanding as a recent IMB report indicated that from the period of 2003-2012, Ghana, 
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Cote d’Ivoire, and Benin have seen an increase in piracy attacks.
238
 With inaccurate 
reporting on attempted attacks and attacks, the knowledge of how pervasive maritime 
piracy has become in the region is blurred and incomplete. That said, maritime piracy is 
rapidly evolving in the Gulf of Guinea as its base of operations now extends into 
neighboring states. 
Motivating factors  
 A contributing factor behind the upsurge in piracy in the Gulf of Aden was the 
failure of governance and state collapse in 1991.
239
 Following the ousting of President 
Siad Barre, the country fell into a virtual anarchy that opened the door for illicit activities, 
including piracy. Other experts contend that piracy arose as a form of protection against 
toxic dumping and illegal fishing from foreign vessels. Toxic dumping and overfishing 
did have a devastating impact on the livelihoods of the Somali population. Not only could 
fisherman no longer fish and sell their catch to purchase food for their families, but they 
could not find other employment to make up for their lost income.
240
 Therefore, in the 
absence of a functional government, dismayed Somali fishermen took matters into their 
own hands to protect its offshore fishing areas.
241
 What initially began as a campaign to 
protect their fishing grounds and maritime domain from illegal activity soon provided a 
rationale to use piracy as an alternative to recoup lost income.
242
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Thus, the economic incentive became the motivating factor. At the onset, most 
attacks were conducted by fishermen tired of foreign fishing fleets dumping toxic waste 
and illegally fishing in Somali waters.
243
 These fishermen chose to rob and attack foreign 
vessels to make up for lost income and protect its economic exclusive zones (EEZ).
244
 
However, such attacks did not stop illegal fishing and did not provide significant ransom 
rewards for hijacked crews and fishing vessels. With such extreme onshore economic and 
social hardships in Somalia, it did not take long before pirates shifted towards a more 
indiscriminate targeting campaign that included all commercial vessels.
245
 The psyche 
among pirates and those joining the ranks shifted towards a profit-driven mentality. It 
was more lucrative and less dangerous to attack large, slower and unarmed commercial 
vessels than the risk of being killed pursuing armed fishing vessels.
246
 A change in the 
pirates’ motivation also meant a change in target zones to accommodate profit demand. 
The Gulf of Aden was a perfect option because of the high concentration of commercial 
freight and guaranteed bounty. Not only was hunting easy, but shipping companies were 
willing to pay ransom to retrieve their hijacked vessels and crew. In fact, ransom ranged 




In the Gulf of Guinea, the motivating factors were driven political and social 
grievances. Like the Gulf of Aden, the socio-economic conditions, such as poverty, high 
unemployment, and lack of economic opportunity on land were present; however, the 
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link between oil development and its impact on the marginalized ethnic groups in the 
Delta profoundly influenced oil theft and piracy. Because Nigeria is the linchpin for the 
region as Africa’s most populous and largest oil producing country, security experts 
argue that Nigeria is the microcosm for regional maritime security.
248
 In fact, maritime 
security is vital to exploit maritime resources, secure livelihoods and promote sustainable 
development; however, if neglected it leads to acute security challenges. As seen in the 
Delta, food insecurity and environmental degradation influenced illicit activity in 
retribution to neglect by the Nigerian central government.
249
  
Oil theft has its roots with Nigeria’s most marginalized ethnic groups. For a 
country of 150 million people, the oil-rich Delta is home to 30 million ethnically diverse 
peoples of which 30 percent remain unemployed. Less than one-percent of Nigeria’s oil 
revenues, which account for 95 percent of its foreign exchange earnings, ever reach the 
Delta communities. Coupled with the fact that 60 percent of the people in the Delta 
region depend on the natural environment to sustain themselves, substantial oil pollution 
has also degraded farmland and fishing grounds. In fact, the United States Development 
Program (UNDP) reported there have been more than 6,800 oil spills recorded.
250
 
Agricultural land, fishing grounds, and drinking water remain contaminated, which have 
left the people of the Delta without a social safety net and income. With deepening 
poverty and no hope of employment, frustrations have erupted into violence over the lack 
of control of its natural resources and extreme environmental degradation.
251
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These social and political grievances branded an ideology of injustice and 
exploitation into the psyche of the Delta inhabitants. The psychological impact is cross-
generational and even provided armed militia groups, like MEND, with the legitimacy 
and a base of operations to attack onshore oil infrastructure and vessels off the Nigerian 
coast.
252
 In 2008 alone, over 150,000 barrels per day (bpd) were stolen as a result of oil 
bunkering (tapping a pipeline or ship to steal oil) and piracy. Although a small percentage 
compared to Nigeria’s daily production, it forced oil companies to reassess onshore 
operations in the pursuit of ‘safer’ offshore options.
253
  
Most concerning is how the economic incentive is rapidly becoming the 
motivating factor behind piracy. Although some claim to be fighting for social and 
political freedom, the link between political activism and oil theft is blurred.
254
 In fact, oil 
theft is influenced by a toxic mix of organized crime, rising small arms proliferation and 
the illegal trade of refined petroleum products.
255
 With the political pretense lost in the 
Delta, there is no need for oil thieves to limit their target selection. As a result, there has 
been a spike in offshore attacks on product tankers or chemical tankers off the coast of 
Togo, Benin and Ghana. These attacks are a carbon copy of the Nigerian model that is 
centered upon social and political grievances and greed.
256
  
Tactical capacity and business models behind operations  
 In the Gulf of Aden, piracy tactics shifted from uncoordinated, small attacks 
towards large-scale integrated operations. A typical attack group is now comprised of 
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about 10 armed pirates in three skiffs, which are under the command of a chief.
257
 These 
pirates are well-armed with weaponry, like assault rifles, machine guns, anti-ship 
ordinance and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs). These weapons are purchased illegally 
from Somalia, Ethiopia, and Sudan where munitions are plentiful and cheap. At the 
moment, Somali pirates do not have access to Global Positioning Systems (GPS), night 
vision goggles or vessel identification systems, which might explain why over 90 percent 
of their attacks occur during the day. But, Somali pirates have implemented a more 
complex attack strategy where they employ the use of mother ships, which are larger 
vessels used as a base for smaller skiffs, to provide extended range for operations and 
also avoid detection from patrolling naval vessels.
258
 Such coordination and integration 
illustrates the adaptive capacity of Somali pirates and heightened opportunism that took 
the international community by complete surprise.  
Target selection has also evolved over the past decade. Once the profit motive 
was introduced, Somali pirates expanded their target selection. With the hijacking of two 
high profile vessels – a Saudi oil tanker and a Ukrainian vessel transporting Russian-
made tanks, the Somali pirates’ showed a willingness to take more risk in targeting 
bigger vessels. In order to carry out such attacks requires a vast network of spies in 
foreign ports to alert pirates of targets, improved communications and detection 
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 The end goal for the Somali pirates is to collect a ransom for the vessel and crew. 
Unlike other parts of the world, Somali pirates rarely show a willingness to harm their 
hostages during raids, since a ransom payment is the objective. Although ransom is a 
concept as old as piracy itself, the overall success of Somali operations cannot be 
overlooked. It is estimated that the annual ransom paid to Somali pirate networks in 2008 
(peak year) ranged from $50 million to $130 million.
260
 Although ransom payments 
dropped in recent years due to the international response, Somali piracy has provided 
unprecedented wealth to those with few opportunities. 
261
  
While it might seem like this business model is simple, there are actually several 
moving parts that offer a complex network of operations. First, the Gulf of Aden pirates 
emphasize the importance of leadership structures, duties and tasks for all actors, and the 
creation a revenue-collection system. In this system, everyone is given a task and duty 
and it is expected that each individual perform their assigned tasks effectively if this 
model is to function seamlessly. Further, the business model has seven critical phases: 
reconnaissance and information gathering on targets, coordinated pursuit, boarding and 
takeover, steaming to safe area, negotiations, ransom payment, and disembarkation.
262
 
Similar to a corporate model, the sustainability of operations will depend on financiers, 
effective leadership, government support, recruitment and a profitable end-goal.   
In contrast, Gulf of Guinea attacks are also well-coordinated, but pirates narrowly 
focus on targeting the oil industry rather than indiscriminate targeting. Further, pirates are 
also more violent than their counterparts, sometimes killing crewmembers or oil 
personnel during an attack. These attacks are described as “robbery at sea” where the 
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modus operandi is to “smash and grab” at night by striking ships at anchor or oil 
platforms.
263
 Some analysts define piracy and armed robbery in three categories: low-
grade theft of stores, crew’s possessions and money; theft of oil and hydrocarbons during 
ship-to-ship transfers; and attacks on other ships for food, fuel and other material.
264
 Most 
significant is oil theft because of its value, availability and accessibility. The end goal for 
these oil gangs is to steal oil, either from tankers or pipelines, for the sole purpose of 
selling it to local or international black markets.
265
  
Tactics used are an extension of onshore criminal activity. For decades, the Delta 
served as a base of operations for illegal bunkering, a popular practice among criminal 
gangs to steal oil through pipelines.
266
 Although considered different illegal activities, oil 
bunkering is linked to piracy in the targeting of crude carriers anchored at port. The 
frequency of attacks on shipping has steadily increased as the IMB reported 32 incidents 
of armed attacks and hijackings off the coast of Nigeria and Togo within the first six 
months of 2012 alone. This is attributed to an interest in the offshore oil cargoes amidst 
the abundance of oil transiting the Gulf of Guinea. These oil gangs recognize that oil-
laden vessels are more lucrative targets and provide a financial incentive once its cargo is 
siphoned off and brought to shore. With extensive onshore networks including illicit 
refineries, pirates can find buyers and sellers immediately that often range from corrupt 
government officials to former oil and gas employees.
267
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Oil piracy is well-organized and is transnational in nature. To sustain operations, 
oil piracy involves eight-stages: target selection, planning, deployment, attack, trans-
shipment, transportation, storage and disposal. Because operations are sophisticated and 
include attacks on vessels and infrastructure across national borders, it is common for oil 
gangs to recruit people of different nationalities. This allows these gangs to overcome 
language barriers and geographical unfamiliarity, but also provides a wider scope of 
operations in neighboring coastal waters and harbors.
268
 In addition, these pirates attempt 
to influence decisions about land-based matters, often in a violent manner in order to 




Organizational structure  
 To understand who is involved in piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, it is 
important to examine the hierarchy of command and control. The Somali piracy network 
is complex and involves actors on land to ensure operational capacity is sustainable. 
Many people are involved – from the dealers who supply the pirates with the fuel to the 
financiers that provide logistical support beyond Somalia’s borders.
270
 More specifically, 
a piracy hierarchy starts with the tribal or clan leaders that have significant influence over 
coastal regions and piracy operations. Equally important are the financiers that provide 
the capital needed to purchase skiffs, weapons, fuel, and solicit new recruits. Whether it 
be local businessmen, foreign investors or even expatriates, these investment dollars are 
critical to operational capacity. In exchange for ‘seed money’ pirate gangs give half of 
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the proceeds from an attack to financiers.
271
 Next, the “high-rollers” are the leaders 
behind the piracy networks and have command over the attack groups – security squads, 
mothership crews, attack squads and negotiator teams. These bosses are also in charge of 
recruitment. In most cases, young men from clans and sub-clans with a long lineage of 
piracy are hand-picked to ensure the most experienced individuals are recruited.
272
 This is 
a crucial aspect to the longevity of operations because of the high attrition rate. In fact, 
most pirates retire after their first successful hijacking since their share of the ransom can 
bring instant wealth.  
The pirate hierarchy is a symbiotic relationship between foot soldiers, local 
businessmen, clan and tribal leaders, financiers, coastal communities, and terrorist groups 
who all benefit from supporting the network. In the absence of a centralized government, 
illicit networks can flourish and expand. In fact, the warming relationship between the 
terrorist organization al-Shabaab and Somali pirate networks is quite concerning. 
Following an alliance after years of fighting, it was reported that al-Shabaab trained 




 If the Somali piracy organizational structure is hierarchical, then piracy in Gulf of 
Guinea can be described as a more cellular-focused system. Based on Nigeria’s oil theft 
and oil piracy, these operations are not run by one person, family or ethnic group as 
management tends to be more cooperative than based on command-and-control. Also, 
structures vary from network to network. For instance, membership depends on the size 
and location of its operations, its needs and broader political entanglements. However, 
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there are roles still required to be filled for these operations.
274
 An operation requires 
“high level opportunists” (government officials, security personnel or local godfathers) to 
collect profits from theft by virtue of their standing. Next, “facilitators” (lawyers, 
accountants and corrupt bank managers) provide cash for operations and help launder the 
profits. Those involved in the “operations” (local youth, former IOC employees, armed 
criminal group, militias or even local elites) are in charge of installing illegal taps, 
loading oil, and gathering intelligence on oil, ships and state security service movements. 
To safeguard the transit of the stolen oil, “brokers” sell stolen oil to local and foreign 
buyers, which require support from local middleman, politicians, private commodities 
traders, security contractors (local armed militia) and access to smaller ships and 
commercial-grade tankers.
275
 Although oil theft is an entrepreneurial and opportunistic 
business, it is not easy to gain access. To join a small or large-scale operation requires an 
ambitious or well-placed individual that can either start a protection racket or offer 
services to an existing network. 
 Information on these oil theft networks is elusive, but one certainty is that these 
networks are well-established and profitable because of widespread corruption. Already a 
significant issue in Nigeria and the region, oil theft and piracy flourish because of the 
financial payoff.
276
 In fact, the success of piracy and oil theft depends on the support of 
government officials, military commanders, riverine communities, militia and criminal 
groups, unemployed youth, foreigners, financiers, buyers and oil companies.
277
 Thus, 
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efforts to dislodge and dismantle such complex and well-entrenched operations will 
require sustained pressure, time and patience.   
EXISTING ANTI-PIRACY OPERATIONS 
  While it is critical to illustrate how maritime piracy is markedly different in each 
region, an exanimation of anti-piracy operations is also pertinent to the discussion. It is 
important to analyze the scope, dimensions and success of such initiatives. This section 
explores how industry, governments and the international community have responded to 
the piracy threat and how effective the response has been in each region.  
The private-sector’s response to piracy threats   
 In the Gulf of Aden, commercial shipping has been most impacted by piracy. 
According to international shipping organizations, insurance rates for ships rose to 
$20,000 per voyage in 2008, almost a forty-fold increase because of hijackings.
278
 
Further, the cost of taking alternate routes can add 3,500 miles to the journey and is more 
expensive for shipping companies especially as global oil prices steadily increase. 
Deterrence options are even expensive. For example, long range acoustical devices cost 
up to $30,000 each and permanent onboard security guards are prohibitively 
expensive.
279
 However, commercial shipping companies have had to implement changes 
simply because there is no choice. In particular, the shipping industry has instituted self-
protection measures, known as Best Management Practices for Protection against 
Somalia Based Piracy (BMP4s). These BMP4s include: 24-hour watch, physical barriers 
like netting and electrical razor wire, high-pressure water hoses and foam, evasive 
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maneuvering tactics, the addition of safe-rooms where the crew can maintain control of 
the vessel, and sonic weapons.
280
 As a non-military option, BMP4s have been quite 
successful despite the fact that they are not mandatory and are expensive. Smaller to 
medium-sized shipping companies often forgo these options and transit high-risk waters 
unprotected. Ironically, two-thirds of the vessels targeted by pirates in the region are the 
same ships without protective measures.
281
 
The IMB also recommend shipping companies adopt operational and 
communications security (OPSEC) to minimize ship-to-shore communications about 
cargo, routes and on-board security. Because Somali pirates use spies and intelligence 
gathers, it is imperative for transiting vessels to exercise “radio-silence” to avoid 
detection.
282
 This also can be achieved by redirecting vessels to sail farther away from the 
Somali coastline, more than 600 nautical miles offshore to keep out of very high 
frequency (VHF) radio range from land.
283
 However, drastic maneuvers near the Horn of 
Africa where some waterways are constricted on the approach to the Bab al-Mandab 
strait make it impossible to avoid the Somali coastline. 
 Perhaps the most expensive option and also the center of international debate is 
the use of PMSCs onboard ships. Although self-help industry measures are effective in 
warding off attacks in the Gulf of Aden, they do not guarantee security in this vast 
maritime domain. Even with a large international contingent of naval vessels in the 
region, it is difficult to protect every inch and respond to every attack. Therefore, 
commercial shipping companies that are willing to pay have turned to PSMCs to protect 
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their vessels and crews. Often called the “100 percent solution” because there has not 
been a single successful attack on a ship utilizing PSMCs, it has been an effective option 
since its introduction in 2011.
284
 However, there are not a common set of regulations over 
the use of PMSCs in the maritime domain. Without a similar international code of 
conduct that applies to land-based private security companies, interpretation of its powers 
and legal responsibilities in the open seas is still under debate and scrutiny. 
 In contrast, the Gulf of Guinea involves more than just commercial shipping 
companies, but also the oil and gas industry. Commercial vessels transiting and operating 
and offshore oil and gas infrastructure are highly susceptible to attack. Furthermore, 
because littoral states have jurisdiction and are responsible for policing their maritime 
domain, security limitations are put on the oil and gas industry. As a result, IOCs 
operating in the Gulf of Guinea, like ExxonMobil, Shell and Chevron have implemented 
“voluntary principles” for maritime security of personnel and infrastructure. This 
includes enhanced surveillance for offshore platforms, pipelines and vessels and 
coordinated intelligence-gathering with national army and police agencies.
285
 Also, to 
monitor international financial networks that profit from oil theft and piracy, Shell started 
lacing its crude oil with unique synthetic tracers to identify stolen oil at the point of 
purchase when it re-enters a legitimate market.
286
 This strategy follows the 2000 
Kimberley Process where governments, industry and civil society signed an initiative to 
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The close relationship between IOCs and NOCs and oil-producing states provides 
extra security benefits. For instance, oil companies use state law enforcement and have 
access to the national army and police if personnel, facilities and infrastructure are 
attacked. In an effort to further bolster protection, oil companies hire private military 
companies (PMCs) to prevent sabotage and attack.
288
 PMCs are different than PMSCs in 
that they are security outfits recruited and trained by national governments to assist the 
oil industry. They are also more expensive and uphold the interests of the state.  
As for commercial shipping, it is difficult to ensure safe transit and operation in 
the Gulf of Guinea because of limited regional and international capabilities. Similar to 
Somalia, shipping companies implemented BMPs, such as anti-boarding mechanisms, 
on-deck lighting and lookout towers. However, counter-piracy mechanisms are not 
mandatory under IMO guidelines, which leave vessels highly vulnerable when anchored 
in ports. Because this is within territorial waters, the use PMSCs have not been given the 
authority to operate and international naval forces are also restricted in their interdiction 
capacities. As a result, shipping companies depend on regional naval and coast guard 
forces to protect vessels. Unfortunately, these forces are ill-equipped and ill-trained to 
conduct counter-piracy operations.
289
 To improve regional naval and coast guard 
capabilities, international navies have sponsored joint training operations with these 
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International and regional responses – a perspective of flexibility and capability  
Because the Gulf of Aden intersects international waterways and Somalia does 
not have a functional government, the international community took unprecedented 
action to combat piracy. Considered a landmark international resolution due to its 
unanimous support, the UN Security Council (UNSC) approved the Resolution 1851 in 
2008. The move authorized states with navies deployed in the Gulf of Aden to take action 
against pirates in Somali territorial waters and on land.
291
 Since authorization, there have 
been three naval task forces created. Most notably, the Combined Task Force (CTF-151) 
was established with the sole mission to conduct anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of 
Aden and off the Somali coast. CTF-151 established a Maritime Security Patrol Area 
(MSPA), a corridor in the Gulf of Aden that provides safe passage for commercial traffic 
and acts as a deterrent for pirates.
292
 In 2009, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) deployed maritime forces under “Operation Allied Protector” to conduct anti-
piracy operations and assist regional states in developing maritime surveillance and 
interdiction initiatives in their territory waters.
293
 The European Union (EU) also entered 
the anti-piracy campaign by creating a combined naval force (EUNAVFOR). In 2008, 
EUNAVFOR conducted anti-piracy operations, including the protection of World Food 
Program (WFP) vessels off the Somali coast.
294
 Apart from CTF-151, NATO, and 
EUNAVFOR, other countries have sent naval vessels to protect and escort shipping, 
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including India, China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea and Japan. Collectively, this 
represented an unprecedented mobilization of international naval forces to combat 
maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden.  
To foster a more regionally-inclusive environment for anti-piracy, the Contact 
Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) and the Djibouti Code of Conduct 
(Code of Conduct) were established. The CGPCS was tasked with addressing military 
and operational coordination, capacity building, judicial issues, shipping self-awareness 
and information related piracy. Within the CGPCS and its working groups, focus was 
placed on developing a BMP guidance document to provide advice for masters operating 
vessels in the Gulf of Aden.
295
 This led to the creation of BMPs, which are supported by 
the shipping industry. On the other hand, the Code of Conduct was initiated by the IMO 
in an effort to focus on the repression of piracy and armed robbery against ships in the 
western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden while providing a forum for regional 
dialogue. This high-profile meeting was attended by regional governments where nine 
East African states signed the accord and signified a starting point for anti-piracy 
cooperation and coordination.
296
 In fact, three regional facilities in Yemen, Kenya and 
Tanzania were established to serve as anti-piracy centers to carry out the directive in the 
Code of Conduct – to suppress piracy through cooperation by means of information 
exchange, joint patrolling and capacity building among navies of coastal states.
297
 
Although there is a growing international involvement to counter-piracy 
initiatives in the Gulf of Guinea, a strategy of response is primarily expected to come 
                                                          
295
 The United Nations, “Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia,” January 14, 2009.   
296
 Baniela, 200-201. 
297
 Onuoha, “Sea Piracy and Maritime Security in the Horn of Africa: The Somali Coast and Gulf of Aden 




from the regional states. In 2007, the establishment of a new US Africa Command 
(AFRICOM) was launched to oversee US forces on the continent and resolve armed 
conflict through state-building. Its largest program, the Africa Partnership Station (APS), 
sponsors military and nonmilitary programs designed to increase the capacity of African 
navies.
298
 The US Coast Guard also administers the African Maritime Law Enforcement 
Partnership (AMLEP) out of APS to assist West African states to develop capabilities to 
patrol waters and act when a maritime crime, like piracy, is committed. Although these 
are highly successful initiatives, the United States and international community do not 
have the same flexibility to operate in the Gulf of Guinea. Thus, emphasis is placed on 
assisting the region to improve maritime security and legal structures. At the regional 
level, conferences on maritime security cooperation have provided a platform for 
dialogue between African Union (AU), Gulf of Guinea Commission (GCC), Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Maritime Organization of West and 
Central Africa (MOWCA), EU, United States and other partner states. While it is an 
important first step, the willingness between the Gulf of Guinea states to work together 
has been uneven, slow and piecemeal.
299
   
 At the national and bilateral level, there have been more successful counter-piracy 
efforts. Nigeria transformed its Joint Takes Force Operation Restore Hope, which was 
initially established to combat militancy in the Delta, but now has expanded into 
maritime security, known as Operation Pulo Shield. In 2012, Operation Pulo Shield 
targeted pipeline vandalism, crude oil theft, illegal oil refining and forms of robbery and 
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 At the bilateral level, Nigeria and Benin established a joint maritime patrol to 
improve surveillance and target piracy. It represented the first type of bilateral 
cooperation of its kind in the region and has set the stage for a future joint patrol 
operation between other states.
301
  
The international community has also taken some steps to address the growing 
maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea through the passage of UN resolutions. In 2012, 
UNSC adopted two major resolutions, 2018 and 2039, which call on a greater regional 
response to piracy. There has been criticism that these two resolutions on maritime 
security are more aligned with military action opposed to a soft intervention where focus 
was placed on treating piracy purely as a security problem.
302
 This is evident in how 
traditional donors, like the United States, France and the United Kingdom choose to 
assist local powers to combat piracy. Specifically, support and aid comes in the form of 
capacity building for naval forces, including training, equipment and boats to boost the 
region’s maritime domain awareness and improve overall operational capacity to deter 
attacks and respond rapidly.
303
  
GAPS IN THE COUNTER-PIRACY STRATEGIES FOR THE GULF OF GUINEA 
 By analyzing the current counter-piracy operations currently in play, it is just as 
critical to identify the current gaps in counter-piracy operations. Since the Gulf of Guinea 
is one of the largest offshore oil arenas in the world, further examination of the counter-
piracy deficiencies is pertinent to the discussion of how maritime piracy could impact 
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future offshore development and to what extent strategies for the Gulf of Aden could 
translate in West Africa.  
Absence of maritime domain awareness (MDA) 
 MDA represents one of the most notable weaknesses in the region. This broad 
term refers to the situational awareness of anything in a state’s waters or territorial or 
EEZ that could affect the state’s security, safety, economics, or environment.
304
 In the 
Gulf of Guinea, trafficking in oil, petroleum products, arms, drugs, people and illegal 
fishing has flourished with the existence of transnational criminal networks. This is partly 
due to the negligence of national governments, who carry a narrowly-focused land-
centric approach to security. As a consequence, there is a lack of basic surveillance 
systems, materiel and trained personnel to assist in enforcing and policing their territorial 
waters. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, patrol boats are 
deficient in the region, with most listed assets categorized as “unseaworthy” in Angola, 
Benin, Congo and Nigeria.
305
 The lack of capacity and capability is also a rooted in the 
lack of political will by West African leaders who fail to invest in measures and 
structures for maritime security. This stems from the poor maritime culture in many 
African cultures, but also mistrust in their neighbors, prohibitive costs, the lack of support 
from the general public, concern about the repercussions of apprehending and 
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 The absence of MDA at the national level has created an obstacle to effective 
regional cooperation in the governance of offshore areas. For instance, countries that lack 
vessels, aircraft, communication systems, personnel or an appropriate legal infrastructure 
might not be able to play a constructive role in combatting piracy.
307
 This is concerning 
because the international community and oil and gas industry depend on Gulf of Guinea 
states to address maritime threats. Collective action can hasten the region’s ability to 
overcome inefficiencies of current counter-piracy operations. Such inefficiencies, like 
inadequate early warning systems and intelligence-sharing capabilities, deficient response 
capabilities, and the inability to sustain patrol operations, littoral states must be addressed 
to drastically improve region-wide MDA capacity.
308
 
Inadequate law enforcement and judicial ineffectiveness  
Although most Gulf of Guinea states are signatories to UNCLOS and other 
relevant international conventions, few have taken appropriate steps to institutionalize 
these protocols at the domestic level. Similar to maritime domain awareness, the major 
challenge here is also an absence of capability. However, the culprit for an inadequate 
judicial system is directly linked to official corruption at the highest levels of government, 
which allow oil theft and piracy to flourish without consequence. In fact, pirates and 
criminals that are convicted on charges receive only minimal penalties and are often 
released.
309
 It is the corrupting effect of oil wealth that has had a direct impact on a state’s 
ability to prevent oil theft and piracy. There are few places in the world where thousands 
of tons of stolen fuel can be offloaded and sold on the black market, but the Gulf of 
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Guinea represents an opportunity for criminals, government officials, and industry and 
military personnel to profit from illicit operations.
310
 As a consequence, official 
corruption continues to erode governance and the rule of law. As long as corrupt elites, 
government officials and military officers dictate the course of action in the investigation 
and prosecution of arrested oil criminals, there can be little positive traction in the 
dismantling of these criminal networks.  
Gulf of Guinea states have also failed to update legal frameworks and often times 
do not have the judicial capacity to prosecute pirate suspects.
311
 A functional legal system 
enforces the necessary provisions, enacts legislation, devotes adequate financial and 
human resources to maritime security and strengthens institutional-capacity and relevant 
enforcement mechanisms. It also requires sustained political will and ample resources to 
achieve such reform; however, there is a capacity issue in the region. This is linked not 
just to corruption, but also the lack of independence of the judiciary, which is unable to 
enforce compliance or impose sanctions on those that violate rule of law.
312
 Further, poor 
implementation of legal provisions at the national level also impacts the likelihood of the 
creation of an integrated regional framework to tackle maritime security challenges. 
313
 
With poorly codified regulations and sanctions against piracy, there is a need to 
consolidate separate and shared maritime security strategies into a streamlined framework 
that can strengthen regional capacity and effectively engage maritime piracy.  
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Aging port infrastructure and inadequate security 
 Since most oil piracy occurs within 12 nautical miles of the coastline, port 
infrastructure and security represents a critical area of concern for industry and the 
international community. Commercial ships are most at risk when anchored or drifting 
off a port due to insufficient protection at ports to guarantee safe transit or transfer of 
cargo.
314
 These concerns are supported by the fact that ports and surveillance 
infrastructure needs to be repaired, upgraded or replaced. In addition to poor harbor 
maintenance and inadequate law enforcement, bureaucratic red tape and corruption are 
significant factors behind inefficient and unsecured ports and waterways.
315
 The failure to 
address port security is partly responsible for the upsurge in piracy that has led to an 
increase in insurance premiums for shipping companies operating in the region. This also 
impacts states that depend on maritime trade for much-needed revenues. For example, 
after a wave of attacks in 2011, maritime insurance adjustors placed Benin’s waters in the 
same category as Nigeria’s, increasing costs of shipping to the country. As a result, there 




  The burden of responsibility rests upon Gulf of Guinea states to implement 
standards to ensure the safety and security of commercial vessels. However, a recent 
IMO report indicated that Gulf of Guinea states have yet to fully comply with these 
standards for port safety and security outlined in the International Ship and Port Security 
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 As a result, some foreign governments have intervened as it was recently 
reported that US authorities issued a warning that shipping lines doing business in the 
United States might be banned from entering Nigerian ports.
318
 Nonetheless, this is an 
issue facing the continent as no African port is on the list of the top 70 most productive in 
the world. In fact, many African ports, including those in the Gulf of Guinea, cannot 
handle ships of median size due to infrastructure limitations. To reduce their losses, 
shipping companies send smaller, older and cheaper ships to Africa; however, these 
vessels are prime targets for pirates. Either way, an increase of attacks will impact the 




Gross underreporting of attacks and attempting attacks  
A key challenge is the gross underreporting of incidents in the Gulf of Guinea. 
The IMB estimates that only one-third of attempted attacks are reported to its Piracy 
Reporting Centre.
320
 For instance, fishing vessels hardly ever send back reports, although 
they are often attacked. The lack of reporting, even for vessels not transporting petroleum 
products, perpetuates the current state of affairs and masks the true extent of the piracy 
problem. Part of the issue lies in the mistrust in local authorities and the belief that 
investigations can be time-consuming. On the other hand, the IMO has a limited role in 
the region as it does not have operational capacity to enforce recommended guidelines.
321
 
In the end, oil theft and piracy has an enormous cost on oil-producing states where 
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billions in potential revenue is lost each year to these criminal gangs. To improve 
reporting and its accuracy, the IMO must ramp up its presence in the region and work to 
build closer partnerships with central governments and regional organizations.  
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMBATING PIRACY IN GULF OF GUINEA 
 After identifying the gaps in counter-piracy initiatives, the thesis provides some 
policy recommendations that could alleviate certain deficiencies and improve the region’s 
maritime security framework. Some of these policy recommendations are short-term 
solutions while others are focused on long-term problems, such as social and political 
conditions and maritime security capabilities. Collectively, these policy recommendations 
highlight a need to harden and protect oil and gas infrastructure and commercial vessels, 
improve MDA deficiencies of littoral states, combat corruption, strengthen national, 
bilateral, regional and international partnerships, and expand sustainable development 
initiatives. In contrast to the Gulf of Aden, this counter-piracy strategy is much more 
extensive that includes a wider array of options.  
Implementation of a short and long-term option to improve regional MDA capacity   
A short-term solution to MDA deficiencies rests with the introduction of PSMCs 
to the Gulf of Guinea. The resounding success of PSMCs in the Gulf of Aden represented 
a key factor in a rapid decline in successful attacks. Although, PSMCs are limited to 
intelligence gathering and advisory roles in the Gulf of Guinea because of legal issues, 
PSMCs have a proven track record and are a critical offensive solution to deterring pirate 
attacks.
322
 In particular, there are three reasons why PMSCs should be used in the Gulf of 
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Guinea – the increase in insurance premiums, international and regional naval capacities, 
and offshore oil expansion. 
Piracy has resulted in a steady increase of insurance premiums for commercial 
shipping companies that transit ‘war-risk zones.’
323
 Similar to what occurred in the Gulf 
of Aden where premiums increased per ship, per voyage, to $150,000, the Gulf of Guinea 
is also witnessing a spike in insurance premiums. This has an adverse impact on local 
economies that are dependent on maritime trade for revenues, but also private industry. 
With increased insurance premiums, maritime traffic is steadily decreasing because of the 
additional costs associated with doing business in the region. To curb costs, insurance 
companies offered lower premiums, a 40 percent reduction, to shipping companies that 
hired PMSCs.
324
 This financial incentive made PSMCs a popular option with the 
shipping industry as it curtailed insurance premiums and safeguarded its cargo and crews. 
A similar strategy could be adopted for the Gulf of Guinea where insurance companies 
provide the same financial incentivizing program for private sectors operating in the 
region. Not only does this provide a battle-tested security option to prevent attacks and 
protect infrastructure, but it will boost confidence with the private sector and bolster 
investment. 
 PSMCs also provide an immediate improvement to maritime enforcement and 
patrol in the absence of international naval forces. Because international naval task forces 
are strictly limited due to jurisdictional issues and rising costs with maintaining a task 
force, PSMCs represent a cost-effective alternative often overlooked in the current 
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 In fact, a four-man team stationed on a commercial vessel transiting from Asia 
to Europe costs only $50,000, which is much cheaper than paying higher insurance 
premiums or relying on naval vessels.
326
 Beyond the cost effectiveness of PSMCs, 
contractors are well-trained in a wide-array of counter-piracy services. PSMCs are 
experts in hardening of vessels, counter-piracy training, preparation of onboard panic 
rooms, intelligence-sharing and piracy reporting. In an armed capacity, PSMCs can be 
utilized onboard vessels or as an armed convoy escort, both well-equipped to respond to 
attacks.
327
 Provided that most attacks occur within sovereign waters of littoral states, 
PSMCs could provide much-needed rapid reaction response where international naval 
vessels are not legally able to operate.
328
 Further, with over 6,000km coastline to monitor, 
the small contingent of naval forces is not capable of responding to attacks on offshore 
oil and gas infrastructure and commercial vessels. Such limitations prove how critical 
PSMCs can be to improving the region’s maritime security and combatting the piracy 
threat. However, until PMSCs are legally permitted to operate in Gulf of Guinea waters, 
capacity will likely be limited to advisory and intelligence support.    
 Finally, PSMCs can provide immediate protection to new offshore development. 
Since oil is one of the most valuable commodities sold on local black markets, pirates 
have stepped up attacks on oil tankers and offshore oil and gas platforms. In Nigeria 
alone, it has been estimated as many as 400,000 barrels of oil were being stolen each day, 
                                                          
325
 Chalk, 100. 
326
 Anyimadu, 10. 
327
 Brown, 7. 
328
 Thierry Vircoulon and Mark Schneider, “West Africa: Where Navies are not Enough – Fighting Piracy 






costing the country up to $1 billion per month in lost revenues.
329
 More concerning, 
maritime piracy is expanding into deeper waters. The 2005 attack on Shell’s deepwater 
Bonga floating production storage offloading (FPSO) vessel was a stark reminder that 
targets located hundreds of miles away off the Nigerian coast are not insulated from 
attack.
330
 In response, PSMCs can assist the private sector by providing high-tech 
surveillance camera systems, covert tracking devices and satellite communications and 
also deploying armed personnel and escort vessels as deterrence options. Such strategies 
provide valuable information-sharing on potential targets for crewmembers and industry 
personnel and can improve early-response measures.   
 Beside this short-term strategy, it is also necessary to address long-term MDA 
issues. The international community must put stock into the development of an integrated 
regional coast guard force and the implementation of a regional maritime security 
framework.
331
 Both options represent a long-term strategy to address material 
deficiencies and the absence of a coherent regional maritime security strategy. Besides 
Nigeria and Angola, no other Gulf of Guinea state has a navy or coast-guard capable of 
addressing maritime piracy.
332
 Thus, the international community must work with 
regional organizations, like MOWCA, ECOWAS, and GCC to extend assistance in 
planning support, asset donations and training on counter-piracy operations. Specifically, 
AFRICOM and the US Navy need to expand maritime security training programs 
throughout the region. Currently, there are training programs that teach coast guard 
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operations, but is narrowly focused on patrolling deep water areas and national defense. 
Although important, greater focus needs to be placed on the capacity to detect and 
capture pirates in territorial waters.  
The creation of an integrated coast guard network is a regional solution to 
improving upon policing and monitoring of regional waters. To date, the IMO has 
already started working with MOWCA to promote the concept of an integrated coast 
guard network. If it can be put into action, it could provide an effective collective 
response to piracy and oil theft. Specifically, it promotes a multi-agency approach to 
maritime law enforcement including maritime safety, security, countering trafficking and 
border control. This concept was well received by 15 of the 20 coastal states, who signed 
a memorandum of understanding (MoU) in 2008, which outlines a strategy for enhancing 
maritime security and could become a blueprint for wider engagement on regional 
maritime security.
333
 Another complimentary, but critical surveillance option to support 
an integrated coast guard force is Regional Maritime Awareness Capability (RMAC). By 
using an array of coastal radar systems, RMAC allows littoral states to detect and track 
vessels out to 25 nautical miles in all weather conditions. Provided naval and coast guard 




Improve capacity-building and implement anti-corruption measures     
Gulf of Guinea states cannot effectively address maritime piracy without adopting 
anti-corruption measures to improve law enforcement and judicial effectiveness. With 
widespread corruption and the existence of transnational criminal networks, international 
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donor states will be required to jumpstart capacity building.
335
 In particular, international 
donors will have to allocate resources towards improving governance, promoting 
democracy-building and addressing low levels of economic development. Resources 
must be applied to addressing root causes of piracy, like unemployment, unequitable 
distribution of oil revenues, and environmental degradation, and overall resource 
mismanagement.
336
 In an effort to fast-track these capacity-building initiatives, Gulf of 
Guinea states must be allowed to participate in high-level diplomatic discussions with 




 Improving economic and political transparency is another critical component to 
curtailing rampant corruption. This includes striving to dismantle local and international 
black markets, track illicit flows of stolen oil, and reprimand pirates and armed robbers to 
eliminate the profit motivation. One initiative that all Gulf of Guinea states should ratify 
is the Extractive Industries Transparency Imitative (EITI). This initiative was a launching 
point for governments, private sector, civil society groups, investors, and international 
organizations to improve transparency and accountability within the extractives sector.
338
 
Further, EITI has strengthened engagement of civil society and helped monitor and 
evaluate the payment and revenue processes. At the moment, only a few Gulf of Guinea 
states have signed on to EITI even though most IOCs and many NOCs voiced their 
commitment to provide full disclosure of their assets, investments and payments in 
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regions, like the Gulf of Guinea. Although Gulf of Guinea states are not obligated to join 
EITI, it serves as an important step to addressing political corruption and aligning the 
extractive industry to comply with a new set of standards of financial disclosure.  
 Nevertheless, transparency reform is a multi-level, multi-state approach that 
depends on intelligence-sharing, cooperation, and substantial military aid. Areas of high 
priority should include: analysis on volumes of oil stolen, movements of stolen oil, the oil 
theft money trail and security risks associated with oil theft.
339
 In addition, substantial 
military aid will be required to purchase new surveillance ships, planes, and logistical 
equipment to track and interdict ships, illegal refineries and the individuals involved. It 
has been estimated to sufficiently build-up such capacity will cost over $100 million per 
committed Gulf of Guinea state.
340
 To enhance regional law enforcement, there must be 
sustained cooperation and collaboration between the military, the judiciary, policymakers, 
and other domestic agencies to help combat corruption. Collaboration will prevent one 
entity from having full control over resources to deal with maritime insecurity. In the end, 
law enforcement must be able to identify and pursue illicit financiers of oil theft and 
piracy. This is of particularly importance to the Gulf of Guinea where transnational 




BMP guidelines must become mandatory in order to address port insecurity  
 Based on the success of BMPs in the Gulf of Aden, employing similar self-
protection measures for commercial shipping companies and offshore oil and gas 
infrastructure would be a critical step towards deterring attacks in highly vulnerable port 
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areas. With most Gulf of Guinea ports in dire need of new infrastructure and security 
enhancements, upgrades are prohibitively expensive and will not happen without 
assistance from international donors. In the interim, BMPs provide an effective defensive 
strategy for vessels and offshore infrastructure to enhance early-response mechanisms 
and employ deterrent options through the use of physical barriers.
342
 Also, shipping 
companies need to improve communication with naval and port authorities to ensure that 
the Automated Identification System (AIS) remains on at all times. The AIS system, 
similar to a transponder for an airline, can help the private sector and IMO to accurately 
track a ship’s passage and report any security incidents or sightings of suspicious craft.
343
  
A more pressing reason for making BMP guidelines mandatory is the impact it 
has had on repelling attacks in the Gulf of Aden. In fact, two-thirds of targeted vessels in 
the Gulf of Aden were those without any of these self-protection measures. In other 
words, failing to adhere to these BMP guidelines leaves those vessels at risk to attack. To 
prevent this, the international community and shipping industry need to develop a trust 
fund and training program and also provide smaller firms and vessels with the financial 
flexibility and capacity to implement BMPs. In the event of noncompliance, those 
shipping companies should be levied substantial fines.
344
  
Enhance piracy reporting through the establishment of a regional anti-piracy center  
 Maritime piracy represents a regional issue where Gulf of Guinea states must 
collectively act to address the threat. One effective method to ferment regional 
cooperation can come through the establishment of a regional center for combatting 
piracy. For example, in the Gulf of Aden there are three such centers that provide an 
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opportunity for East African states to meet to discuss progress on existing counter-piracy 
initiatives and also enhance cooperation on new methods of approach to suppress piracy 
and armed robbery of ships.
345
 Currently, no regional anti-piracy center exists in the Gulf 
of Guinea and this remains a focal point in ongoing discussions over maritime security. 
Besides the lack of personnel, training and resources, there is an insufficient use of 
communication networks between Gulf of Guinea states. This adversely impacts response 
times to oil theft and piracy and even provides oil gangs with renewed confidence to 
carry out attacks without the fear of reprisal.  
 The establishment of a regional anti-piracy center can provide a forum of 
cooperation between four main types of actors – navy and coast guard, police, judiciary 
and private industry. Piracy is a local and regional problem that requires global solutions 
and one lesson learned from the Gulf of Aden was although naval forces achieved great 
success, it was incredibly difficult to collect evidence and share intelligence and 
information.
346
 Similarly, the Gulf of Guinea is also faced with issues of coordination 
between actors at the national and regional level. Therefore an important first step should 
include local engagement of institutions and actors on issues of communication and 
coordination. This will require drastic restructuring of existing institutions in Gulf of 
Guinea states as domestic agencies have overlapping responsibilities and are unprepared 
to address the piracy threat. The IMO continues to push the idea of joined-up maritime 
thinking where each state establishes a national maritime security commission. Not only 
will it streamline operational capacity between national agencies, but it will reinforce 
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 In the end, an anti-piracy center provides a much-needed shift away 
from land-based security towards an integrated and collaborative approach towards 
maritime security for the entire region.  
Strengthen partnerships and tackle the root causes of piracy  
 For these policy recommendations to put into action there must be improved 
engagement and support from the international community to help develop domestic 
good practices. Some scholars argue that the international community has a moral 
responsibility to combat corruption and maritime piracy because it has the funds and 
experience required.
348
 Therefore, the role of the international community needs to focus 
its support on advising, training and equipping local security forces and promoting 
regional and international coordination. On one end, it involves strengthening the laws 
and legal systems of Gulf of Guinea states, training their law-enforcement authorities in 
the conduct of maritime law-enforcement operations such as ship boarding and searches, 
and working with the AU, MOWCA and ECOWAS to promote African leadership and 
regional cooperation in the area of maritime safety and security. On the other end, the 
private-sector needs to be engaged as a legitimate stakeholder. Not only does the oil and 
gas industry have a history of conducting operations in the region, but they also are better 
organized and have the resources to respond to some of the challenges in the region, like 
oil theft and maritime piracy.
349
 Nevertheless, it is in the interests of the oil and gas 
industry to forge new partnerships with Gulf of Guinea states in order to minimize 
disruptions to production output and help rebuild investor confidence. One way to 
strengthen partnerships can come through working with local governments to promote 
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sustainable economic development to rebuild public support and help provide 
employment alternatives to oil theft and maritime piracy.
350
  
 With 60 years of operating in Nigeria, Shell has attempted to adapt to rapidly 
changing political and economic conditions. Although Shell continues to operate in the 
Delta and offshore, it has suffered considerable losses to production over the decades due 
to oil theft and sabotage. To address production losses, Shell has expanded investment in 
community development, access to energy, environmental protection and education. 
Although these are important initiatives to alleviate high unemployment, illiteracy, and 
poverty, Shell does not have the budget or expertise to headline massive sustainable 
development projects. Despite these constraints, Shell maintains their commitment to 
major projects to boost Nigeria’s supply of gas and power and provide secondary 
education opportunities for thousands of Nigerians.
351
 Corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) is becoming an area of growth within the oil and gas industry, especially since 
new supply coming online is also located in more volatile regions of the world. In fact, 
the Gulf of Guinea represents not only a region of volatility, but a true test for the oil and 
gas industry. If substantial offshore oil and gas is to be extracted, companies like Shell, 
Chevron, Total, and ExxonMobil will have to increase investment dollars and efforts to 
expand development programs. Such efforts can help boost local employment and social 
services that have otherwise been deprived by central governments. Although this is not a 
quick-fix, the oil and gas industry must be a valuable contributor and actively engaged in 
community development to help stem maritime piracy.  
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 Maritime piracy has reemerged as legitimate threat to global seaborne trade and 
future offshore development. In particular, the Gulf of Guinea has seen a rapid increase in 
maritime piracy often influenced by social and political grievances. As one of the most 
critically important oil producing regions, the oil and gas industry has expressed concerns 
about security and safety of its infrastructure and employees. On the other end, oil 
exports are the main source of revenue for many Gulf of Guinea states; however, 
prevailing structural conditions, like weak governance, widespread corruption, ineffective 
law-enforcement, high unemployment, and the inequitable distribution of wealth provides 
a suitable environment for maritime piracy that could destabilize the region. Collectively, 
the threat of maritime piracy could adversely impact regional stability, economic growth, 
and future offshore development. To address the growing threat, it is pertinent to examine 
other regions, like the Gulf of Aden, that can provide valuable insights on why this threat 
is so pervasive, what the root causes are, and what counter-piracy strategies are effective.  
It is purpose of the thesis to provide a comparative analysis of the Gulf of Aden and Gulf 
of Guinea. Since contemporary piracy is rare, this approach is pertinent and timely.  
In the Gulf of Aden, the collapse of the Somali central government in 1991 
provided the impetus for unemployed Somali fisherman to find alternative methods to 
recoup lost income.  Maritime piracy became the most lucrative option and without any 
form of central government or law enforcement, the Gulf of Aden and the Somali coast 
quickly became the most dangerous maritime region where hundreds of commercial 
vessels and their crews have been hijacked for ransom. Not only did piracy impact the 




an effort to dismantle these piracy networks, the international community mobilized 
several naval task forces to patrol and interdict Somali pirates. It also forced the shipping 
industry to harden vessels and employ armed contractors to deter and protect its cargo, 
vessels and crew. Although these counter-piracy strategies have helped minimize the 
success of an attack, the question is whether such strategies can also work in the Gulf of 
Guinea.  
There is no question that there are geopolitical differences in each region that 
influence why young men join these illicit networks, what targets are selected, the type of 
tactics are used, and what the end goal is. Despite this, both piracy networks are 
multilayered and complex and require a wide-array of actors to support, finance, and 
organize future operations. Coupled with transnational criminal networks to the mix, 
maritime piracy is now integrated into other illicit activities, like arms smuggling and 
drug trafficking. This makes it difficult to track financiers and dismantle these 
interconnected transnational criminal networks. Without effective law-enforcement, 
however, these networks will only expand without fear of reprisal   
When examining counter-piracy operations, there here are two significant 
obstacles to combatting piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. It is a regional domain and does not 
intersect sea lines of communication (SLOCs), which are primary maritime routes 
between ports, used for trade, logistics and naval forces. Because international 
intervention is limited due to jurisdictional issues, the burden of responsibility rests on 
littoral states. Unfortunately, widespread corruption, ineffective law-enforcement, and 
limited naval and coast guard capabilities to patrol territorial waters inhibit their ability to 




examination of gaps in counter-piracy operations is required to address these 
shortcomings. It is evident that the lack of capacity between the littoral states does stem 
from the lack of political will to combat piracy. This is influenced by several factors, 
including prohibitive costs of building naval and coast guard capabilities, misconception 
that some states are insulated from piracy, and a long-standing focus on land security 
rather than maritime security. Coupled with political and social conditions, piracy 
represents an outlet for the most marginalized to put their grievances into action. Without 
measures to enforce and monitor territorial waters, maritime piracy is now occurring 
attacks farther offshore and across national boundaries.   
To bridge the region’s maritime security inefficiencies, the international 
community and the oil and gas industry need to assume lead roles in providing assistance, 
training and material to the littoral states as well as introduce counter-piracy strategies 
that can immediately address this threat. This should involve not just short-term strategies, 
like the use of PSMCs and BMPs to protect and harden vulnerable commercial vessels 
and offshore infrastructure, but also long-term strategies. The more long-term 
engagements will likely include the development of an integrated naval and coast guard 
network where littoral states will be responsible with patrolling regional waters. Further, 
improving intelligence and surveillance-sharing capabilities is another necessary step to 
improve early warning capabilities to effectively respond to threats. Such long-term 
strategies can succeed only if a cooperative and collaborative approach is supported 
among the littoral states and domestic agencies. These options address the glaring MDA 
inefficiencies in the region and with international assistance, an integrated maritime 




Building stronger partnerships with Gulf of Guinea states and regional 
organizations is also imperative. Cooperation presents the best long-term strategy to 
countering piracy, but will hinge on the commitment of political leadership among littoral 
states and the recognition that maritime piracy is a security threat. Equally important, the 
oil and gas industry must be included in future partnerships given that they have 
significant interests in the region. Their involvement in counter-piracy operations is 
critical because of their economic importance to the region and expertise in addressing oil 
theft. Nonetheless, there are a plethora of regional and international organizations that 
can serve as a platform to addressing maritime insecurity as well as discussing the next 
steps for implementing an integrated maritime security framework. Whether this involves 
the IMO, IMB, APS, GGC, MOWCA, AU or AFRICOM, these organizations and others 
can be utilized to improve maritime security and address transnational crime. Because oil 
piracy is similar to other type of profitable organized crime, effort needs to be made to 
prosecute those involved and dismantle the networks. Currently, the lucrativeness of 
maritime piracy in the Gulf of Guinea continues to embolden its actors and encourages 
new entrants into the business. This is an influencing factor that continues to make piracy 
enticing and only threatens offshore development if partnerships are not strengthened or 
sustained.  
It boils down to commitment at the national, bilateral, regional and international 
level to deal with maritime piracy. At the national and regional level, Gulf of Guinea 
states must adopt new resource management practices to leverage their oil affluence 
effectively to deal with economic issues – such as widespread poverty, unemployment 




agencies in intelligence gathering and sharing. This includes working together with 
relevant state agencies in gathering evidence to aid prosecution. Further, Gulf of Guinea 
states need to demonstrate a will and commitment to enhancing the judicial process 
where pirates and armed robbers are punished as well as groups or organizations 
financing and facilitating illicit oil sales. At the international level, there needs to be 
sustained efforts to build up maritime security forces and also develop a regional security 
mechanism that can be ratified by all Gulf of Guinea states. Also, the international 
community must assist in overseeing the creation of legal instruments that fight illicit oil 
trade and arms smuggling and shipping lines involved in illicit oil transactions. 
In the end, the Gulf of Guinea presents a myriad of challenges to combatting 
piracy. Because international intervention is not possible or widely supported, the Gulf of 
Guinea must find alternative strategies to address this maritime threat. The combination 
of short and long-term solutions as mentioned represents the most effective option. In 
order to provide reassurances to the private sector, the adoption of BMPs as well as the 
use of PSMCs can offer immediate protection. It also will help bolster confidence with 
the private sector that vessels, infrastructure and personnel are secure from attack. The 
success of these counter-piracy strategies in the Gulf of Aden should not be ignored and 
do offer an effective short-term solution to piracy. When looking at the long-term outlook, 
maritime insecurity must be tackled primarily by the Gulf of Guinea states. With 
assistance from the international donors, these littoral states should be capable of 
developing MDA capabilities, including a new regionally integrated naval and coast 
guard force to monitor and interdict pirates. Also, the adoption of anti-corruption 




projects can provide viable economic alternatives to would-be pirates. That said, the 
success of these counter-piracy strategies will depend on the political willingness of 
leadership among the littoral states and their commitment to combating this threat and 
transnational crime in the region. Failing to do so will carry significant ramifications not 
just for global oil markets and economies, but could further destabilize an already 











































The central goal of the thesis is to provide a snapshot of evolving global energy 
market and emerging trends driving offshore oil and gas exploration and production. 
Although the shale oil and gas revolution continues to dominant headlines and global 
energy security discussions, the offshore represents a longer term solution to growing 
supply constraints. Given the size of the recoverable reserves and emergence of advanced 
drilling and seismic mapping technologies, IOCs and NOCs can exploit previously 
difficult-to-reach seabed oil and gas deposits. With the expansion into deep and ultra-
deep waters, resource competition is also intensifying because of the strategic importance 
and the need for more supply.  
Looking at the bigger picture, NOCs control roughly 75 percent of proven crude 
reserves with the remainder held by IOCs.
352
 Given that most of the NOC – controlled oil 
is located in the politically volatile Persian Gulf, IOCs have an interest to expand into 
offshore regions to bolster production and its declining RRR stockpile. Coupled with 
higher production costs and fewer big discoveries, IOCs have little option but to explore 
oil and gas deposits in more volatile regions. Beyond the political risks, there is an 
incentive to develop the offshore, which it is estimated to contain over 200 billion barrels 
or more of recoverable reserves.
353
 Further, IOCs are capable to undertake more 
challenging offshore drilling operations because of their decades of experience and 
ability to undertake such capital-intensive operations. It also allows these IOCs the ability 
to lower operating cost per barrel, and produce profitability in very high costs areas. 
Unfortunately, such offshore discoveries in the SCS, the Arctic and the Gulf of Guinea 
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epitomize emerging risks associated with such development. Not only are these regions 
located in more remote areas, but conditions for drilling are more difficult and production 
costs continue to increase as offshore project present more significant challenges. IOCs 
understand what is at stake and are budgeting more dollars to better understanding the 
risks associated with such capital-intensive projects.     
Nonetheless, offshore production remains a key component to energy security for 
many countries. Amy Jaffe argues the stakes could not be higher especially since 
deepwater activity accounts for a majority of new conventional oil production. The IEA 
projects deepwater production will increase to 9 million b/d by 2035 and will account for 
over 50 percent of total world offshore oil production.
354
 That said, there are emerging 
political, legal, economic and environmental risks that might inhibit future activities. 
Beside traditional political and legal risks, like regional and social turmoil and 
sovereignty disputes there are other risks that also need to be considered. For instance, 
climate change, regulatory issues, emergency response preparedness, and security threats 
also pose a challenge to future activities. To this end, it is critical to adopt risk mitigation 
strategies that address these risks and promote a safer and more sustainable offshore 
strategy. Mathew Gordon argues that after the Macondo disaster, “there has been an 
increased focus on the mitigation of risk. The industry has reviewed operational practices 
from top to bottom. Everyone from the operators to offshore specialists has been affected 
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 The first chapter examines the SCS and the opportunity to develop its extensive 
seabed oil and gas reserves in the presence of intractable sovereignty and jurisdictional 
disputes. To date, the claimant states involved in disputes have been unwilling to cede 
control over geographical features and are even more assertive due to the discovery of 
hydrocarbons. With the Asia-Pacific region is expected to pace global energy demand, 
the SCS has emerged as a hotspot for tension and confrontation. In order to diffuse 
tensions and extract seabed resources, the chapter presents a mitigating strategy that 
shelves disputes and jointly develops resources. The JDA instrument has been 
successfully implement in other disputed maritime regions, but not in the SCS. For this 
mechanism to succeed, claimant states and their political leadership have to support the 
concept.  
 However, the JDA is faced with numerous barriers to implementation and none 
other is more influential than the current political climate. In fact, the JDA cannot 
overcome claimant assertive behaviors as a zero-sum approach over the discovery of 
hydrocarbons is the status quo. Coupled with resource scarcity fears and resource 
competition, the SCS epitomizes the growing political risks associated with several 
import-dependent states seeking to gain leverage over other claimants to control seabed 
oil and gas deposits. Perhaps the most critical factor influencing policymakers of the 
claimant states is the reemergence of nationalism. The rise of nationalism is in part driven 
by these long-standing disputes in the region, but is also fueled by public opinion and 
resource competition. The thought of appeasing disputes to support a joint development 




from party hardliners are hard to ignore. With such a negative opinion of resource sharing, 
political leaders have attempt to table the JDA option out of fear of reprisal from 
constituents and political parties. In the interim, unilateral attempts to explore oil and gas 
deposits in the SCS have taken place.  China, Indonesia, Vietnam and the Philippines all 
want to expand their offshore operations often without much consideration to 
international maritime law. This only escalates current tensions.   
Nonetheless, these claimant states and others ultimately decide the fate of how 
resources will be extracted and managed. Although the current political climate does not 
provide the ideal environment for JDA implementation, there have been attempts in the 
ECS and Southeast Asia to utilize these provisional instruments as a means to sidestep 
ongoing maritime disputes for the sake of joint oil and gas production. A regional 
solution is the preferred path for the claimant states, but if they are unwilling to shelve 
disputes in order to collectively develop this valuable offshore region, JDAs will not be a 
viable option in the near future.  
The second chapter explores the opening up of the Arctic to large-scale 
development. For decades, exploration and production has taken place, but until recently 
was largely restricted to onshore and near-onshore operations.
356
 Today, expansion is 
driven by the immense potential – over 90 billion barrels of undiscovered technically 
recoverable oil and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids.
357
 But, the Arctic is an 
extreme climate with unpredictable weather, freezing temperatures, prolonged darkness 
and dangerous ice flows. It also is undergoing significant ecological change from climate 
change and global warming. Because of its remote location and sensitive environment, 
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operation costs are prohibitive and result in project delays. And this raises significant 
concerns about the preparedness of the oil and gas industry to operate further offshore 
and gaps in current governance and regulation standards. Thus, to ensure risk does not 
outweigh reward, the chapter identifies two governance options, a hard-law and soft-law 
option that can tackle the environmental and economic risks, including climate change, 
environmental protection, spill response preparedness, and the sustainability and safety of 
offshore activities.  
The adoption of a new international convention for offshore activities, similar to 
the ATS structure, is unlikely to gain support from the Arctic states and the indigenous 
organizations who want to avoid internationalization. Therefore, a non-legally framework 
aligned with the AC is a more feasible option. The AC has been inclusive to Arctic states, 
indigenous peoples, and non-Arctic states and has already implemented offshore oil and 
gas guidelines, expanded climate change research, funded environmental impact 
assessment studies, and researched an integrated ecosystems management strategy. 
Although the AC is not a policy-making organization, its adaptability to an evolving 
region makes it a viable solution to oversee large-scale development. The AC also 
provides a platform for dialogue between the Arctic’s most important parties as well as 
non-Arctic member states and organizations. The concept of inclusiveness should not be 
underestimated especially given what is at stake for the region in light of future 
development. The AC continues to evolve and is a vital intergovernmental forum for 





 The final chapter explores maritime piracy in the Gulf of Guinea and how this 
threat jeopardizes future offshore development in this oil-rich region. With most future 
development expected to come from offshore fields, a common misconception is these 
activities are far from onshore political instability and are insulated such turmoil.
358
 
However, oil theft and piracy is a maritime security challenge that could destabilize the 
entire region. In fact, the Atlantic Council Counter-Piracy Task Force stated pirate attacks 
have “become more frequent, more violent, and are occurring farther out from shore.”
359
 
This is in part due to the fact that the region is a perfect incubator of piracy, providing 
both resources and a base for operations. Unlike Somali pirates, who focus on the ransom 
of captured crew members, pirates in the Gulf of Guinea make their income from oil theft. 
Whether hijacking a tanker or siphoning the oil to resell it on the local black market, 
pirates primarily target this lucrative commodity.  Given there is a steady supply of 
tankers and an increasing number of offshore platforms, oil provides a constant flow of 
income for these pirates and armed robbers. Further, the prevalence of illicit networks 
means it is not difficult to establish and maintain onshore bases where they plan and 
launch operations further offshore.
360
 Some other political factors, like poverty, 
corruption and the inability to monitor and protect territorial waters, has provide the 
rationale for the most marginalized and even high-ranking officials to join into these 
illicit activities. Because Gulf of Guinea states lack maritime capabilities, piracy cannot 
be deterred as they are ill-equipped and ill-trained in counter-piracy tactics. Without 
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inadequate coast guard or naval capabilities and a deficient law enforcement system, 
tankers and offshore oil and gas infrastructure remain vulnerable to attack.   
To better understand piracy and the strategies to combat the threat, the chapter 
compares maritime piracy with that of the Gulf of Aden where piracy has also succeeded 
to disrupt international seaborne trade. In this analysis, the chapter examines the counter-
piracy operations under the coordination of the international community and the 
effectiveness of such operations. Beyond the similarities, the Gulf of Guinea and its 
regional political situation present a different challenge to combatting piracy. Most 
notably, an international mobilization of naval forces is not feasible because of 
jurisdictional issues. Rather, the private sector and littoral states must address the current 
gaps in counter-piracy operations by adopting several strategies. The private sector can 
utilize PSMCs and implement BMPs, both strategies adopted in the Gulf of Aden, to 
provide short-term solutions to maritime piracy. On the other hand, littoral states must 
improve MDA capabilities and capacities if they are to adequately protect territorial 
waters. Further, efforts to curb corruption and expand upon economic opportunities 
among the region’s most marginalized people are critical to remove the financial motive 
behind piracy and oil theft.  
The adoption of an integrated regional maritime security framework is also a 
critical step forward to combat piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. To succeed, cooperation 
between littoral states, its agencies and organizations has to be sustained and expanded as 
it serves as an effective tool to collectively act through improving regional maritime 
security. In addition, fostering new and existing partnerships with international donors 




piracy, but will also help attract new investment from the private sector and military aid 
in the form of material and training for counter-piracy operations. To date, the United 
States has supplied over $35 million to train and equip local forces to combat piracy 
while the United Nations has called for a regional summit to coordinate a comprehensive 
counter-piracy strategy for the Gulf of Guinea.
361
 In the end, it is difficult to ignore the 
limited capacity of the littoral states, which are dependent on international donors to 
provide logistical, material and intelligence support for decades to come. Counter-piracy 
initiatives and the security of offshore development rests on regional powers and the 
international community working together. Whether this is through the promotion of 
sustainable onshore development, economic diversification, better resource management 
or the improvement of the region’s overall capacity and capability to protect its maritime 
domain, these issues must be addressed if future offshore oil and gas development is to 
reach its true potential.   
AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Within each chapter, there are issue areas that could be further researched to 
strengthen the risk analysis and explain the ever-changing contours in energy geopolitics. 
Considering the fact that energy geopolitics is rapidly evolving, it is important to 
highlight certain issue areas that are pertinent to the discussion of the thesis. Without 
question, there are implications associated with offshore development and the thesis 
touches on political, legal, economic, environmental and security risks in each chapter. 
That said, each region is different and there is not a one-size fits all solution to such risks; 
however, more research will help identify a wide array of strategies that can be 
implemented to mitigate potential risk. It is in the best interests of the international 
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community to further study offshore energy geopolitics and its impact on global energy 




Climate change and its impact on offshore development  
 Climate change presents a growing challenge to existing and future offshore 
activities. When Hurricane Katrina blew through the Gulf of Mexico, over 482 
production platforms and 79 drilling rigs were evacuated and 1.4 million b/d of oil and 
8.3 billion cubic feet per day (bcfd) of natural gas production was shut in. Further, the 
cumulative production lost totaled 6.1 million bbl of oil and 34.2 bcf of natural gas.
363
 
This prompted then President George W. Bush to release oil reserves from the Strategic 
Petroleum Reserve (SPR) to compensate for the loss of domestic production and mitigate 
global oil price shocks. This example illustrates how extreme weather events can cause 
severe supply disruptions and also impact global energy markets. Coupled with global 
warming, these extreme weather events, like hurricanes and other intense storms systems 
are intensifying and becoming even more unpredictable. Moreover, the vulnerability of 
energy infrastructure is of growing concern especially as more projects are moving 
further offshore into more remote and harsher climates, like the Arctic. With the energy 
industry rapidly becoming more integrated and interconnected to physical and 
communication infrastructure, the impacts of climate change must be thoroughly 
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researched and assessed to better understand the risks and the consequences that supply 
disruption might have on global energy markets.
364
   
 Further research should focus on what the oil and gas industry is doing to address 
climate change as part of their day-to-day operations and future projects. This should 
include any climate research projects that tackle the sensitivity of marine environments 
and the impacts of climate change and development. There also should be a focus on 
adaption strategies to ensure the safety and stability of its offshore infrastructure can 
withstand extreme weather events and a rapidly changing marine environment. Advanced 
technologies have helped harden infrastructure and improve the integrity and operability 
of offshore platforms and drilling rigs, but government regulators also must be actively 
engaged in updating regulatory and compliance standards and developing new adaption 
and resilience strategies. This has been a problem in the United States where regulators 
have had difficulty keeping up with offshore drilling that is rapidly becoming more 
technologically advanced and complex.
365
 Beyond critical infrastructure, more research is 
needed as to what the oil and gas industry is doing to address greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions, gas flaring, and CO2 capture and storage. These issues are relevant in helping 
reduce the carbon footprint and impacts on marine ecosystems that provide sustenance 
for millions of people.
366
 
Resource nationalism and its potential link to SCS disputes  
One of the biggest concerns about resource nationalism is that energy scarcity 
could lead governments to use military force to securitize access to supplies. Some 
                                                          
364
 World Economic Forum, “The New Energy Security Paradigm,” WEF (Spring 2006), 22-23. 
365
 Jaffe and MacDonald, 5.  
366
 IPIECA, “The Oil and Gas Industry and Climate Change,” International Petroleum Industry 




scholars argue that the risk of conflict escalates when the economic value of the reserves 
(similar to the SCS) is viewed favorably by claimant states.
367
 Although it is not possible 
to “lock up” supplies in a truly global resource market, it is the mere attempt to do so by 
claimant states that is exacerbating tensions.
368
 It is also argued that the expanded role of 
NOCs is influencing an already toxic competitive atmosphere in the region. Mikkal 
Herberg argues that growing resource competition among the claimant states to promote 
their own NOCs and gain control over oil and gas supplies perversely undermines each 
government’s confidence in fair access to future supplies and thereby reinforces a spiral 
of strategic distrust.
369
 Nevertheless, more research could ascertain how credible these 
issues are and if resource nationalism is driving competition and intensifying disputes 
between claimant states. In particular, China is the most power of the claimant states with 
the largest offshore holdings. To better understand China’s regional maritime strategy 
and energy security agenda, an in-depth analysis of its policies could provide a clearer 
picture of their future offshore development plans and commitments to resource-sharing 
and resolving sovereignty and disputes. It is also important to analyze what role ASEAN 
has had in joint development discussions and if the DoC, signed by all claimant states, 
has been a productive agreement for expanding dialogue on JDA implementation in the 
region.
370
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The resource curse and its relationship to state insecurity  
When addressing security threats to offshore development in the Gulf of Guinea, 
an examination of the ‘resource curse’ and how it relates to state insecurity is pertinent to 
the discussion of maritime piracy. The ‘resource curse’ is attributed to socio-economic 
and political problems, including the lack of economic diversification, civil conflict, 
widespread corruption, and authoritarian regimes. This phenomenon threatens production 
and exportation of oil and is a pressing concern for states dependent on external sources 
of energy.
371
 Because the Gulf of Guinea is a hotspot for political insecurity, the 
‘resource curse’ is a causal factor that to some extent precipitated armed conflict in the 
Delta and influenced oil theft and piracy. In fact, Nigeria, Angola and Equatorial Guinea 
have witnessed violence and unrest, which is driven by grievances over revenue-sharing, 
corruption, and pollution.
372
 In particular, widespread official corruption is endemic 
among most resource-rich states in the Gulf of Guinea. Rather than invest resource 
revenues into infrastructure and education, crooked politicians, often in collusion with 
industry, siphon proceeds from the continent's mineral and petroleum wealth into their 
own pockets. This only solidifies social and political grievances among the poor and 
marginalized and promotes a violent reaction.
373
 Further research into how this issue 
interplays with piracy and other criminal networks is a critical element to ongoing 
maritime security challenges in the region. Moreover, understanding how the ‘resource 
curse’ impacts the political climate is a critical step to fixing long-standing structural 
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conditions that inhibit production potential and exacerbate onshore and offshore 
insecurities.  
The emergence of Boko Haram and its impact on offshore activities   
Not discussed in the thesis is the threat of terrorism to offshore activities. In 
particular, the Gulf of Guinea is the only region in the portfolio where terrorism is of 
legitimate concern. The emergence of Boko Haram in Nigeria has raised concerns with 
the international community about state stability and regional security implications. Boko 
Haram has carried out attacks on Nigeria's police, military, rival clerics, politicians, 
schools, public institutions, and civilians with increasing regularity since 2009. Some 
experts point out the group represents an armed revolt against government corruption, 
abusive security forces, and regional economic disparity in an already impoverished 
country.
374
 This is strikingly similar to the violent conflict in the Delta and epitomizes the 
spike in domestic violence and political upheaval against the central government. 
Although there is not a direct link to Boko Haram and piracy, the group is expanding 
operations into the southern Christian-dominated regions of Nigeria.
375
 Nevertheless, 
Boko Haram presents an emerging challenge to Nigerian state security that might have 
wider implications to regional security if military and police forces are unable to contain 
this emerging threat. Since Nigeria is a critical oil producing state and has experienced an 
increase in oil theft and piracy attacks, Boko Haram could link into these illicit networks 
to purchase weaponry and offer support. Similar to other organizations like MEND, Boko 
Haram could also widen its target selection to include oil infrastructure in order to 
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finance the organization and further weaken the central government’s control over the 
country.   
Improve industry-wide contingency plans and oil spill preparedness  
According to Amy Jaffe, “history teaches us that change after a spill is inevitable 
and can be long-lasting. Previous major oil spills have resulted in substantial policy 
changes. The 1989 Exxon Valdez spill led to a mandate that all oil tankers built for use in 
U.S. ports must have full double hulls.”
376
 Twenty years earlier, the Santa Barbara oil 
spill galvanized the environmental movement, and drilling is still banned off California 
coasts. However, accidents can still happen and after the Deepwater Horizon disaster in 
2010, there are concerns about how prepared the oil and gas industry is to effectively 
respond to a “worst case scenario.” As offshore projects expand into more challenging 
marine environments, there is a demand to study regulatory frameworks in order to 
identify gaps in existing safety and risk standards. States that adopt this approach will 
likely implement stronger safety and environmental laws to promote safer drilling. 
However, there has no consistency on regulation and safety standards. To date, the oil 
and gas industry has attempted to improve their contingency plans, but such 
improvements have been sufficient to address the challenges in an evolving marine 
environment. Thus, further research needs to be placed on best practices and the 
exchange of information between the industry and governments to encourage the 
implementation of new standards. Also, an in-depth analysis of the oil and gas industry’s 
views and strategies of oil spill preparedness could shed light on the future outlook of 
emergency response. In the event a spill occurs, it is critical to focus on the plans and 
processes in place to ensure effective response. Conducting thorough investigations of 
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significant incidents is another way to understand the causes and highlight lessons 
learned to prevent future incidents.  
Oil spills are more important than ever before because future development is 
expected to occur in more remote offshore areas. Thus, a concerted effort between 
regulatory authorities and the oil and shipping industries must work to develop better 
preventative measures to minimize the risk of an accident and in the case of an accident, 
help reduce the amount of oil spilt. This needs to include further examination of the 
absence of critical infrastructure in onshore regions, the effectiveness of clean up and 
rehabilitation technologies, the geographical differences of maritime regions, and 
environmental impacts associated with oil spills.
377
 This discussion is most pertinent with 
the passing of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Exxon Valdez disaster. Minimizing 
accidents is critical to the sustainability of future offshore development and the protection 
of marine ecosystems. As seen in a recent federal report on the Exxon Valdez, sea otters 
recovered to their pre-spill numbers in the most affected areas, but many serious impacts 
from the 1989 spill still linger even a quarter century later. In fact, small amounts of oil 
are still visible on beaches in the Gulf of Alaska.
378
 Although accidents happen, the 
ramifications to a spill are long-lasting and can reinforce negative perceptions of the oil 
and gas industry.  
Corporate social responsibility  
 The oil and gas industry also continues to expand its investment into corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) initiatives. Such initiatives are focused on environmental and 
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social issues, such as spill prevention, environmental protection, pollution reduction, 
community engagement and sustainable development programs. To date, the shift is 
driven by the growth in corporate codes of conduct and social reporting. In fact, the oil 
and gas industry has embraced major international CSR initiatives such as Kofi Annan’s 
Global Compact and the Global Reporting Initiative. Further, Shell and British Petroleum 
(BP) are significant players in renewable energy, and shown a commitment to combating 
carbon dioxide emissions to minimize their contribution to global warming.
379
 Finally, 
the oil and gas industry have initiated, funded and implemented significant community 
development schemes. According to one estimate, global spending by oil, gas and mining 
companies on community development programs in 2001 was over US$500 million. 
Many oil and gas companies have built schools and hospitals, launched micro-credit 
schemes for local people and assisted in the creation and funding of youth employment 
programs in developing countries.
380
 They even participate in partnerships with 
established development agencies such as the US Agency for International Development 
(USAID) and UNDP, while using NGOs to implement development projects.  
 However, these CSR initiatives and the overall effectiveness have been highly 
questioned. In fact, some argue that CSR programs are a way for the oil and gas industry 
to promote a safer work environment and manage negative perceptions among 
communities. On the other hand, NGOs contend these programs are typical strategies 
adopted by the oil and gas industry, whose efforts to behave responsibly is primarily 
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 Nonetheless, CSR programs do provide an 
important option to mitigate conflict and widening violence by tackling economic 
disparity among the unemployed and poor and ensuring that oil pollution does not have a 
long-lasting impact on the surrounding environment. Also, through the support of 
sustainable development initiatives, the oil and gas industry can rebuild its reputation in 
certain regions, like the Gulf of Guinea, and gain public support among riverine 
communities where armed robbers and pirates carry out their operations. Moreover, more 
research is required on CSR effectiveness as well as an in-depth analysis of any 
shortcomings to these strategies.   
CONCLUSION 
The thesis highlights a pertinent study of three maritime regions slated for future 
offshore development. However, political, legal, economic and environmental risks must 
be assessed to weigh the threats to future development. In the SCS, a pervasive negative 
climate makes the joint development option untenable in the presence of a zero-sum 
approach. In the Arctic, large-scale offshore development must align with efforts to 
improve safety and regulation standards to enhance operational sustainability to cope 
with climate change, environmental sensitivity and rising production costs. Finally, oil 
theft and piracy represent a real security threat in the Gulf of Guinea that is driven by 
political and social factors. The international community and the littoral states must 
collaborate to adopt a wide-array of counter-piracy initiatives to help dismantle illicit 
operations and transnational criminal networks as well as protect existing and future 
offshore investments. Together, the thesis highlights how offshore energy geopolitics 
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continues to evolve as it includes new threats to exploration and production.  In the end, it 
is in the best interests of the private sector, policymakers, security experts, and NGOs to 
minimize risks with resoluteness as they carry significant implications to global energy 
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